

The second is the fact that, during the mid 60s, the United States and Canada, co-operating in the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), allowed active defence against the manned bomber (the air breathing threat) to decline to a minimal level. As indicated in the next section, the justification for this was the marginal incremental nuclear threat posed by the Soviet strategic bomber force. With time, however, the forces committed to this activity have required replacement if only because of obsolescence, thus drawing attention, particularly in the United States, to the absence of adequate defences against bombers and cruise missiles. In the United States debate, but not in Canada, much has been made of the apparent contrast between the lack of North American defences and the major Soviet resources committed to the task of air defence. Perhaps as a consequence of this, in the late 70s, pressure increased in Congress for a study of air defence, and Congress took a strong interest in the Air Defence Master Plan produced in 1982.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, deployed in 1957 across the 70th parallel in Canada, and linked to other radars across the Pacific and the Atlantic, has also become obsolescent at a time when increased research and development in surveillance technologies is taking place in the United States. Any air-based or space-based surveillance system designed to cover the northern approaches to the continental United States has military and political implications for Canada, and is bound to influence Canadian decisions concerning capital equipment.

All of these factors have combined to raise the political and strategic profile of continental defence, and of the US-Canadian partnership therein, posing defence policy issues for Canada which are perhaps reminiscent of those in the early 60s, and emerging at a time when severe constraints on the Canadian defence budget tighten the choice between equally plausible options in defence procurement. This paper seeks to clarify these issues and to identify the major choices facing the Canadian Government. In particular, it addresses the following five broad areas of concern:

- the historic pattern of relations between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defence;
- trends in superpower offensive force deployments, paying particular

<sup>3</sup> At the time of the 1981 NORAD renewal the two countries issued a "Joint Policy Statement on the Air Defence of North America" which affirmed that the two countries "should be considered as a single entity for purposes of air defence". The North America Air Defense Master Plan (NAADMP) was distributed to the relevant agencies of the US Government on 28 January 1982. The Presidential programme therein called for "the resolution of existing surveillance deficiencies by deployment of new ground radar and employment of additional airborne radar sensors. Coverage will be expanded by Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radars and improved microwave radar systems. Also, additional AWACS aircraft are to be procured for North American air defence to augment ground-based radars in peacetime and to provide surveillance and control interceptors in wartime. Active air defence capability will be significantly enhanced by replacing five squadrons of aging F-106 fighter with F-15s". To date, the United States has not acquired the additional AWACS aircraft, but other elements of NAADMP have proceeded.