7. and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be difficult to achieve

8. and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas.

On the basis of this "consensus" definition (a logically consistent hybrid construction), Confidence-Building Measures are undertakings that try to correct the misperceptions and fears that breed mistrust in the realm of national security concerns. Although the specific measures themselves are or are related to military capabilities, the underlying dynamic is psychological. The intent is to rehabilitate the image of the adversary. The absolutely crucial assumption, of course, is that no state that is a party to a CBM regime actually has deliberate intentions to use military force. If that assumption is in serious doubt, then the Confidence-Building process is unlikely to enjoy genuine success.

Categories of Confidence-Building Measures

Another way of looking at the concept of Confidence Building is to examine the different ways in which analysts have attempted to produce categories for different types of CBM proposals. Although the construction of various categories is unlikely to produce a radical revision in our way of thinking about CBMs, the identification of patterns and categories should clarify our understanding of the concept. The development of a sensible set of categories will also allow us (in Chapter Six) to impose some sense of order on the countless CBM proposals devised thus far.

There are several useful schemes that have been developed to organize Confidence-Building Measures. Jonathan Alford suggests that there are three basic "modes of operation" of "objective" CBMs.

Type 1 CBMs: Detection of Preparations for War

Exchange of stationed observers at communication nodes and ports,
Reconnaissance flights,
Satellites,
Transition to coded radio traffic from "clear" or uncoded traffic,
Outloading ammunition (conventional or nuclear) from rear depots,
Nonconcealment undertakings.

Type 2 CBMs: Constraints on Preparedness

Zones of limited deployment (land and sea),
Demilitarized zones,
Restrictions on the forward deployment of specific types of equipment (i.e. bridging equipment and strike aircraft),
Manoeuvre limitations (by overall size, location, frequency and duration) (land, sea and air forces),
Movement limits.

Type 3 CBMs: Clarifying Measures

Prenotification of manoeuvres,
Prenotification of military movements,
Observers at manoeuvres,
Restrictions on the carriage of live ammunition on manoeuvres.[47]

Freedman takes a somewhat different approach when he suggests that Confidence Building Measures can be divided into three basic categories:

1. "communication measures" to reduce the chance of war by accident, misinterpretation, miscalculation or unauthorized action;

2. "surprise attack measures" to restrict or constrain capabilities that would (could) be used for or in a surprise attack; and

3. "verification or transparency measures" such as the Associated Measures proposed for observers in the MBFR negotiations.[48]

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[47] Jonathan Alford, "The Usefulness and the Limitations of CBMs," p. 136. The distinction between "objective" and "subjective" CBMs is far less successful. In fact, it scarcely makes any sense.

[48] Lawrence Freedman, *Arms Control in Europe*, pp. 29-31.