

MTCR Partners Meet in Tokyo

From March 18 to 20, Canada participated in a meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners, held in Tokyo. The regime, which aims to limit the transfer of missile equipment and technology, was established in 1987 to address concerns over the proliferation of missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

Recent events in the Persian Gulf have emphasized the need for mechanisms such as the MTCR, and the Tokyo meeting provided an ideal opportunity to review the effectiveness of the regime. Canada recommended that the meeting focus on two points: reviewing the Equipment and Technology Annex with a view to expanding its scope and making it more stringent; and determining which additional countries might be encouraged to adhere to the export guidelines.

The Equipment and Technology Annex presently addresses those items that could assist in the delivery of nuclear weapons. Canada believes that the Annex might usefully be amended to account for the differing parameters (distance and payload) necessary for the delivery of chemical and biological weapons.

The MTCR began with seven participants: Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US. Since 1987, nine additional countries have announced their adherence to the regime's guidelines: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Spain and — most recently — Austria. The current partners will continue their efforts to increase the number of participants and to investigate ways in which to involve less-developed countries.

MTCR partners considered the Tokyo meeting a success. They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening and expanding the regime to better address the problem of missile proliferation. The partners are expected to meet next in Washington this fall.

The MTCR remains an integral part of Canada's network of non-proliferation mechanisms and Canada is committed to active participation in the workings of this group.

protocol for the BTWC, and that the goal of the Third Review Conference should be to gain the mandate to begin the negotiation of such a protocol. Perhaps making the existing confidence-building process politically-binding would be desirable. We shall listen to all these arguments with an open, and in some cases, sympathetic ear. We shall also want to see where the experience gained in the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention might usefully be applied to our deliberations over the next days on strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

However, we should not neglect the smaller, perhaps less dramatic, measures that can be taken in the near term to continue setting out and improving the basic foundation of confidence — namely, greater transparency through information exchange... Require-

ing all parties to give explicit annual notices, even if there is nothing to declare, would be such a small, but useful step. Perhaps there are simple ways we can suggest for removing potential ambiguities from the information already provided in declarations.

Nevertheless, in the pursuit of additional information to support and enhance the objectives of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, we should not, as some of our British colleagues have mentioned elsewhere, become "swamped in a sea of marginal and irrelevant material." In considering new confidence-building measures, we should remain focused on activities that are "directly related" to the objectives of the Convention — i.e., those associated with legitimate defensive research on biological agents and weapons.

CFE Update

Follow-on stalled over Soviet interpretation

When the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed on November 19, 1990, it was anticipated that by early 1991 representatives would have diligently resumed their task of negotiating follow-on improvements to the European conventional armed forces regime in accordance with Article XVIII. Instead, forward movement is stalled as 21 signatories question the actions of the USSR, which has adopted an unexpected interpretation of the Treaty text, specifically Article III, the so-called "counting rules" article.

One of the most important outcomes of the Treaty is the establishment of national limits, which signatories agreed to place on the battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters they will maintain within the Treaty's zone of application, namely the Atlantic to the Urals region. Article III is key to identifying the equipment that is subject to the Treaty's limits. It clearly states that *all* Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) must be counted, except for those pieces falling within the seven areas of exclusion (e.g., museum collections, short-term transit, in production, etc.).

Despite the clear meaning of Article III, the USSR claims that CFE limitations and counting rules do not apply to TLE held by the ground defence forces it subordinates to the Navy and to the Strategic Rocket Forces. This is equivalent to demanding that the USSR be permitted to hold more than 5,400 pieces of equipment in excess of the allocations negotiated with the other Treaty signatories. Canada and the other signatories cannot accept this post-signature demand and are requesting the USSR to adhere to its Treaty undertakings. As proof of the foresight that negotiators had in concluding the CFE Treaty, the Joint Consultative Group is already serving as a forum in which states can make their positions on this problem known to the USSR.