This group of three proposals -- non-dissemination, destruction of some of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and a freeze on the production of replacements -- if agreed upon and implemented, could make a really significant start in the process of disarmament.

We have heard from several delegations — including the Soviet Union and the United States — that the ban on the testing of nuclear weapons should be completed by including prohibition of underground testing. As most delegations probably know, the difficulty here is in connection with verification that all parties are complying with this prohibition. The United States position is that, while it would be possible in the majority of cases to distinguish an underground test from an earthquake, there is still a significant number of events in which this distinction cannot be made by scientific means such as seismological recording instruments. Therefore, a very limited number of inspections on the territory of a country where such an ambiguous event took place would be necessary to provide adequate verification.

The Soviet Union's position, however, is that all such underground nuclear tests, even of a very low power, can be clearly identified by scientific means operated from the national territory of the principal nuclear powers subscribing to the treaty. The Soviet Union delegation at Geneva has been invited very many times, both by Western countries participating and by nonaligned countries, to demonstrate in a scientific sub-committee of the conference exactly how their system of identification works. But it has steadfastly refused to make any demonstration or participate in scientific talks. This leaves the other nuclear powers unable to accept the Soviet contention. The recent advances in the technique of seismic recording and analysis, such as reported on at the meeting of the Royal Society in London last January, encourage us to believe that the technical capability to distinguish at long distances between earthquake signals and those of an underground explosion will shortly have been demonstrated to have been significantly improved. We are hopeful that, on that basis, and provided the need for at least sone "on-site" inspection can once again be accepted in principle by all concerned, it should be possible to make early progress towards a comprehensive test-ban agreement which would command general support. If the Soviet Union would agree to a discussion between scientific representatives of both sides and of qualified non-aligned nations, the question could be settled one way or another. The Canadian delegation hopes that the Soviet Union will agree to such a solution of the problem.

The representative of the Soviet Union and other representatives states that they considered that this Commission should support the idea of convening a world disarmament conference as proposed by the Cairo conference of non-aligned countries held last October. The Canadian delegation would like of non-aligned countries held last October. We have all the members of to make the following points in this connection. We have all the members of the United Nations represented in the present Commission in which we are sitting, 114 nations, I believe. There are several militarily important countries not represented here. It has been tacitly recognized throughout the disarmament negotiations which have been held in the last five years and more that any