

A New Canadian Vision for Europe

EDITOR'S NOTE: As an independent forum on Canadian foreign policy, *International Perspectives* is not designed as a platform for the federal government. Occasionally, however, there are speeches that warrant replication. What follows, edited primarily for brevity, is a recent speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, to an audience at Humber College in Toronto.

If 1989 was the year of revolution, 1990 marks the beginning of a decade of reconstruction. Euphoria lingers but hard work lies ahead.

The revolution of 1989 has fundamental implications for the entire European continent — and for North America which, in terms of culture and history, is Europe across the Atlantic. The requirement for leadership and imagination extends across all issues. That requires a new Canadian approach not only to Central and Eastern Europe but towards the entire European region.

On February 5, at McGill University in Montreal, I announced the initiation of a review of our policy towards Europe. Canada's stake in Europe should not be taken for granted. Powerful new economic and political forces are at work, forces over which Canada has limited influence.

One of Canada's primary interests in the new Europe is to help ensure that Europe does not again become what it once was. Another is to help ensure that Europe becomes a positive force for change both at home and around the world. Two world wars have taught Canadians that a Europe at peace with itself is at peace with the world. Our economic prosperity depends upon a stability in the world. More directly, as a country dependent on trade for 30% of our GNP, the unifying market of Western Europe is vital for jobs and prosperity in Canada, and the vast and untapped markets of Eastern Europe constitute a long-term opportunity of potentially immense proportions.

Canadian interests in the new Europe relate not only to what occurs there but also to what is occurring elsewhere. For decades, our preoccupation with a brittle peace in Europe has hindered our ability to deal with mounting global problems — the threat to the global environment, the crises of international development and debt, the evils of the international drug trade and the proliferation of terror and weapons of mass destruction. Many of these problems do not

have European origins, but our preoccupation with Europe, ideologically and militarily, has kept these other priorities far too low on the global agenda.

While our interests in Europe remain strong, the means by which we pursue those interests must change radically. They must change to reflect the new security framework now in evolution; they must change to reflect the growing power and unity of Western Europe; and they must change to reflect the particular advantages and assets of Canada. The military contribution is bound to decline. It will not be a decline which we regret because it will be a product of the long-sought reduction in East-West tensions which is the result of the new Soviet foreign policy, the dissolution of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the unilateral and negotiated reductions in conventional and nuclear forces.

A firm foundation must be built for a structure of lasting security at the lowest possible level of military forces, conventional and nuclear. It is a seeming paradox that NATO's very success requires the Alliance to renew itself. An organization whose primary role has been to defend against plausible aggression must revise its role when that aggression becomes less plausible. It is only natural in these circumstances for NATO to assume a more political role. That is a change which Canada fully supports. But NATO will only become a forum for increased dialogue if it is used for that purpose by all its members. To a large extent, the future relevance of NATO will depend on the degree to which it adopts, reflects and strives for a broader definition of security. Security must become co-operative rather than competitive. The time for the zero-sum game is over.

NATO must review urgently and comprehensively all aspects of its nuclear and conventional strategy. It makes little sense to retain nuclear weapons whose only target can be our new friends in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. It makes little sense to retain a mili-

tary strategy which is based on a scenario of a surprise attack across a front which no longer exists and where surprise is no longer possible. And it makes little sense to continue to retain in Europe the largest peacetime deployment of military force in the history of the world. This is not to deny the continuing requirement for prudence and military stability. Twelve months does not invalidate the lessons of history. The possibility of instability is there and Soviet military capabilities remain substantial. Therefore, a strong military mandate for NATO continues to be valid and the North American commitment to Europe represented by the presence of Canadian and American troops there is crucial as we strive for strategic stability at significantly lower levels of military force.

It is important that NATO become even more actively engaged in the dynamic security dialogue now emerging. The Alliance should turn outwards to embrace its old adversaries and new friends. To this end, early consideration might be given to the Soviet foreign minister meeting on a regular basis with NATO foreign ministers. In the field of arms control and disarmament, NATO should develop an enhanced capacity and role in confidence-building and verification activities. Dedicated multinational forces on the ground might be deployed for this purpose. NATO should also look to the establishment of a Verification Centre to co-ordinate these activities. In addition, in the context of reviewing its military strategy, NATO should move away from a rigid forward defence to a much more flexible approach involving mobile units, possibly including forces of a multinational nature. NATO's new military posture should minimize force levels and maximize stability. We want to reduce insecurity in the East. But NATO, although of enduring value, has limitations, a function of its mandate and its membership. There are other institutions whose rule must be enhanced and transformed if they are to play a useful role in the elaboration of a new European system. And it is there that Canada must also focus its efforts.

Central among these is the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The principles embodied in its

earlier accords provided the vision and the standards which help inspire the brave democrats of Eastern Europe. The role of the CSCE must not be expanded so that it becomes the drawing board for the new European architecture. As a complement to NATO, the CSCE can become a true instrument of co-operative security, one which would supplement deterrence with re-assurance. And as the nature of European security expands beyond military balances to political stability and economic prosperity, there is a central role for the CSCE in the areas of human rights, economic co-operation and environmental action.

Canada believes that continuing political direction from the highest level is required on a regular and ongoing basis if the CSCE is to realize its full potential. Canada proposes that the CSCE should meet annually at the level of foreign ministers and biannually at the level of Heads of Government. This could serve as the beginnings of a Council for European Co-operation, a future permanent forum for dialogue on pan-European issues. The CSCE should develop a forum to reflect the increasingly democratic character of its membership. Therefore, we also propose the establishment of a CSCE Assembly where parliamentary delegations from member states would meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of common concern.

In the security area, the CSCE will have a role in mandating a further round of conventional forces reduction talks. These talks should be conducted among all 35 members of the CSCE rather than solely the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The CSCE should also increase its role in verification and confidence-building. A CSCE Verification Agency would facilitate and co-ordinate activities mandated by the negotiations on conventional force reductions and confidence- and security-building measures. In addition, there is a potentially valuable role to be played by the CSCE in crisis prevention and conflict resolution. This could involve the creation of a mechanism whereby panels could be established to facilitate dialogue if a crisis develops involving any participating state and to conduct fact-finding investigations if required. This mechanism could recommend a strategy

to resolve the crisis. If the crisis develops into conflict, the CSCE could initiate mediation activities. These activities could be supported by a permanent Institute for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes which would provide expertise for crisis prevention and conflict resolution.

Beyond the security field, the CSCE should build upon the other principles and undertakings contained in the Helsinki agreements. An early opportunity is provided by the Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension. The essential structures of democracy should become a common commitment of CSCE members, including the right to free elections and the rule of law. In the economic dimension, the CSCE may also have a valuable role in the future, building on the tremendous success of the recent Bonn Economic Conference. It should not duplicate existing and effective economic institutions such as the OECD, the IMF and the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. But there is room for growth in encouraging co-operation and dialogue designed to develop common principles of economic activity.

One area requiring urgent attention in the East is the environment, which has been savagely disregarded and desecrated by the old regimes. One or more mechanisms might be created, possibly affiliated with the CSCE, to provide expertise and serve as clearing houses for programmes and information. In designing a new role for the CSCE, we must avoid duplication and new bureaucracies. The goal is concrete action, not talkathons. In this connection, if the CSCE is to assume an activist role in the new Europe, it may well have to modify, perhaps on a selective basis, the current principles of unanimity in its decision-making process.

The European Community is now a welcome and fundamental pillar of the international system. It is one of the great achievements of the post war era and has served as a magnet and model for the reforming countries of Eastern Europe. Increasing co-operation in the political and, eventually, the security fields will ensure European consensus and co-ordination in ways which can only enhance international stability. The EC was founded to subsume past conflicts in the common interest; that mission remains valid. But a

wall dividing Europe cannot be supplanted by a wall around Europe. The new Europe must be open to the West and to the East. Canada has a particular interest in the evolution of an open, united Europe. We are traders and we have a profound interest in the questions of foreign policy which are increasingly the subject of European political co-operation.

Canada-EC political relations should become regular and more institutionalized. We are proposing regular meetings between the Prime Minister and the President of the European Council. These should be supplemented by regular in-depth discussions between the Canadian foreign minister and the foreign minister of each incoming presidency. There should also be regular meetings between Canadian officials and experts on issues of common concern. In addition, we propose that there be an exchange of priorities at the beginning of each presidency which would set the agenda for the coming period.

The degree to which the unification of Germany is accomplished smoothly and without rancour will determine the future pattern of European relations. The 2-plus-4 talks now underway must succeed. There are delicate and important issues to be resolved, including the future of Germany in the Alliance, the size and status of stationed and German armed forces, and the implications for NATO's nuclear deterrent. As these crucial issues are addressed, two realities must be borne in mind: the fact that the Soviet Union has legitimate, central security preoccupations which must be accommodated; and the requirement to ensure that Germany's role retains the popular support of the German people.

Our policy and the future of the new Europe hinges on the continued success of the reforms now underway in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There is an inevitable and daunting period of sacrifice ahead. There will be setbacks. As totalitarian control is lifted, old nationalisms and unaddressed antagonisms will re-emerge. Courage, imagination and statesmanship are required on the part of the governments and populations of the East. And, on the part of the West, patience and prudence will be necessary.