to fight the war on Canadian soil.

1780

So long as the international gangsters are plundering and marauding at large in the world, we can never make Canada so secure that there will not be somewhere some danger of attack. But, as I have repeatedly pointed out, we cannot on that account afford to neglect reasonable precautions. In certain strategic areas we must be prepared to meet sudden raids from sea and air. The maintenance of the security of the base of operations is the most elementary rule of warfare.

To meet the increasing menace of attack on both coasts, the government has taken many important steps to strengthen Canada's capacity to resist attack. For obvious reasons I cannot give to our own people precise information concerning these measures without giving the same information to the enemy.

I am prepared, however, without being so precise as to reveal specific details which might assist the enemy, to give some indication of the steps being taken to strengthen our territorial and coastal defences. What I am about to say on this subject refers mainly to land and air defences. Concerning naval defence, I can add but little, if anything, to what I said on January 26 last. However, there is something that I can add.

Since that date, attacks by many submarines have been made in coastal waters of Canada and the United States. In many cases these attacks have occurred within sight of the shores of this continent. There is no reason to believe that these attacks will not continue and probably become more intensive. Officers of the Canadian naval service have expressed the view that within a few months submarines may well be found operating within the gulf, and even in the St. Lawrence river. It is known that enemy submarines can leave their bases on the European continent, voyage to the shores of this continent, seek their prey for some days or weeks and return to their bases without the necessity of refueling. If enemy submarines do operate in the gulf and river St. Lawrence, an additional burden will be thrown on the Canadian navy. Not only will our navy have the duty of assisting in escorting Atlantic convoys, but it will also have to assume the task of escorting convoys in the river St. Lawrence and in the gulf as well as along our coasts.

The Canadian navy has a share in the primary responsibility for our territorial defence. In the midst of world-wide conflict, [Mr. Mackenzie King.]

warfare on the seas is indivisible. Any Canadian ship of war, wherever it may be operating, is engaged in defending Canada. How or where our ships are employed cannot, of course, be disclosed with exactness. It is, however, common knowledge that the major strength of the Canadian navy is in the Atlantic, sharing in the burden-and bearing a large share—of escorting convoys. This does not mean that the naval defence of the Pacific is being neglected. Inevitably the naval tasks of the united nations are so apportioned as to secure the maximum advantage from their total naval strength.

As I said on January 26, save in so far as the number of available ships necessarily sets the limit to the number of men who can be enlisted for training, no limitation so far as our navy is concerned has been placed upon the number, either of ships or of men.

There is no lack of recruits for the naval service. Indeed there is a considerable waiting list. But in addition to the limitations which have been mentioned as to the number of available ships, there is the further limitation imposed by the difficulty of training men, particularly officers and petty officers. In the nature of things, naval training takes a longer time than the training necessary for either of the other two services. After men have been given all the instruction in the art of naval warfare that can be given on shore, there still remains the long path of varied experience over which they must pass before they are thoroughly equipped for positions of responsibility at sea.

Up to the present the building of navel craft and the training of men to man these craft have proceeded at an almost equal pace. Most of the ships of Canada's navy have been built in Canada, and they are, of course, manned by Canadians. The achievements of Canadian corvettes, named after Canadian cities and towns, have captured the admiration of Canadians generally and have won the praise of naval authorities in other countries. What is true of Canadian corvettes is true also of every other type of craft in the Canadian navy. Officers and men of the Royal Canadian Navy, of the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, and of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, manning armed merchant cruisers, destroyers, minesweepers, patrol boats and other naval vessels have acquitted themselves ably and honourably over wide expanses of ocean. It can be truly said that with every month that passes, Canada's contribution to naval warfare is growing in extent and effectiveness. As that contribution grows, our security increases.

The programme for the army overseas, announced on January 26, is already under

way. At that time, I also gave a résumé of what had been done with regard to the terri-torial defence of Canada, following the out-break of war with Japan. I stated that new units were being mobilized in accordance with anticipated deliveries of equipment. I can now say that, in accordance with that policy, nearly a dozen new battalions have already been mobilized, together with a considerable number of additional anti-aircraft and coast defence batteries. These formations are being given an active role in connection with territorial defence.

I also indicated that the organization of additional formations would depend on developments in the war situation, and mentioned particularly the mobilization of another division. Since that time the war situation has further deteriorated, particularly in the far east. In consequence of this fact the government has authorized the mobilization of two additional divisions, the 7th and the 8th. The additional formations will add depth to our existing and contemplated defences. They will be given the role of mobile reserves, with special reference to the east and west coasts.

I will not repeat what I said in January as to the special steps and special dispositions which had then been made to meet the conditions resulting from the outbreak of war with Japan. Those measures have been implemented. The new mobilizations which I have just indicated are by way of additional security. Our coast defences and anti-aircraft defences are being strengthened week by week as new equipment becomes available, and as new units already authorized complete their mobilization.

The house will understand that, for reasons of security, I cannot give the disposition of these new formations. It has, of course, to be recognized that the ultimate disposition of all troops necessarily depends upon circumstances which determine the course of the war. I can say, however, that both the troops and the equipment available will be disposed of to the very best advantage to meet any anticipated forms or scales of attack.

In the outline I gave of the war programme for the present year, I referred to the fact that the air force, like the navy and the army, had its part in the territorial and coastal defence of Canada and Newfoundland. I added that the responsibilities of the air force on the Pacific coast had been increased by the outbreak of war with Japan. I stated that, in consequence of the increased responsibilities of the air force for territorial and coastal defence, some increase in the home war establishment of the Royal Canadian Air Force must be anticipated. While there are obvious reasons why precise details of the expansion

of our air defences cannot be made public, it can be said that this expansion will involve marked increases in the number of combat squadrons, for reconnaissance, anti-submarine, striking, and fighter operations.

Some indication of the scale of expansion of the home war establishment of the R.C.A.F. is revealed by the rise in expenditures on air defences in Canada. These expenditures are exclusive of the cost of air training. The expenditures were:

In 1939-40 over \$28,000,000. In 1940-41 over \$50,000,000. In 1941-42 approximately \$115,000,000.

The estimates for 1942-43 were originally fixed at \$233,000,000. Events since December ? have led to a new survey, as a result of which this estimate has been raised to \$315,000,000. Long range commitments have been made of an additional \$120,000,000.

I might indicate some of the factors which have made this substantial increase possible. More aircraft are becoming available. Canadian production of combat aircraft is reaching its zenith. Orders placed some time ago in the United States are now being filled. It might be of interest for me to point out that by far the largest proportion of the aircraft will be provided by Canadian plants. The air crew and ground crew required for the expanded programme will be readily available. The British commonwealth air training plan is training pilots, observers and gunners in numbers sufficient to meet all our commitments to our partners in the plan, and, in addition, to provide fully for our home war Our requirements of ground establishment. crew are readily filled by voluntary recruit-The technical ground crew training facilities are easily able to meet the additional demands placed upon them.

The construction of air fields and other defences presents no difficulties. The experience acquired during the years 1940 and 1941, in the construction of home war establishments, as well as air training schools and establishments, has made of) the departments of transport and munitions and supply highly efficient and highly expeditious construction agencies. Most of the essential developments connected with the basic defence of our coasts are either completed or in process of completion. The projects this year will provide mainly for defence in greater depth, and for the development of satellite and auxiliary

aerodromes The last thought or desire of the government would be to lull the people of our country into any false sense of security. No matter how complete our defences may be, we can never be sure of preventing the enemy from attempting some form of attack. To defeat

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