Hitler by request at Berchtesgaden. In the latter half of August frontier incidents began to occur, provoked by Germans. On the 26th August, contrary to the Danzig constitution, Gauleiter Forster was appointed "Head of State (Staatsoberhaupt) of Danzig, so that the administration of the Free City became identified with the Nazi Party. On being notified of this appointment the Gauleiter observed that the step merely legalised a state of affairs which had existed de facto for some years past. By the end of August Germany's demands on Poland had been raised and she was asking for the complete cession of the Corridor and of parts of Upper Silesia. On the 1st September, Germany invaded Poland. On the same day Professor Burckhardt was visited by Forster and informed that his functions were considered to have terminated; he left for Kovno immediately. On the same day Forster, as Head of the State of Danzig, signed a decree by which the constitution was cancelled and the Free City became part of the German Reich.

General Observations.

25. As a political experiment the Free City must be said to have failed. Tension between Danzig and Poland existed from the start. It became acute over the refusal of the dockers to handle munitions for Poland during the Polish-Soviet war, and later became merged in the greater tension between Poland and the Reich. No local patriotism was found in Danzig sufficiently strong to provide a basis for Danzig-Polish co-operation independently of the Polish-German conflict. Any hope there may have been that such civic patriotism would reappear was wrecked by the failure of the Centre and Left parties to keep their majority in the Volkstag as a check on the powerful anti-Polish influences of the Senate and of the parties of the Right. It remains doubtful whether, even under a régime of the Left, with a purely native-born Civil Service and with a peaceful Germany as neighbour, such a local patriotism could have developed in the face of the powerful attraction of the German national life in territories lying close by, both on the east and on the west. As it was, those Danzigers who might have made the Free City a success never had a chance.

26. When National Socialism came into power in Germany, there was no longer any possibility of the Free City being, in any real sense, left to control its

own destiny.

27. Under modern conditions, with freedom of movement between Danzig and Germany, with a German Press and radio, German school and University teachers, and German political parties and organisations, it was probably never possible that the ideal of a City State could be revived, and perhaps inevitable that the Danzigers should pin their hopes on an eventual return to Germany. Even the Weimar Republic never accepted the loss of Danzig as more than temporary. The experience of the Separatist movements in the Rhineland and Bavaria after the War of 1914-18 showed how even the suspicion of foreign backing tends to weaken, if not to destroy, hopes of regional patriotism. In any case, it became clear that a City State of less than half a million inhabitants was at the mercy of its most powerful neighbour, even in peace-time. From the moment when war broke out, Danzig was at once merged in the aggressor State.

The League of Nations proved incapable of maintaining the liberties of the Free City, or of arranging for their protection by any of the Powers. Moreover, frequent Polish refusals to comply with suggestions from the League Council or to accept its good offices in other respects perhaps helped to discourage attempts by the Council to provide against dangers to which the Poles themselves seemed to be blind. From the moment of the Nazi accession to power in 1933 the prestige of the League in Danzig began to decline. The League High Commissioner had no armed forces at his disposal, and he eventually had to comply with the order to quit served on him in the city's name by its German ruler. It is indeed noteworthy that the Allied Powers, who, as members of the League of Nations, "guaranteed" the Free City's constitution, undertook no more specific obligations to implement this guarantee, or to defend Danzig against attacks, than were implied in the Covenant of the League. The failure of the League to defend Danzig was remarkable only because its obligation to do so was more explicit than its obligation in the cases of Vilna, Corfu or Abyssinia.

Neither Germany nor Poland, severally or jointly, can be held entirely responsible for the failure of an experiment which was not of their devising and which, as frequently occurs with compromise solutions, left both States fundamentally discontented. It can, however, be said that while Poland may have desired to alter the status of Danzig, she did not actually succeed in doing so; while Germany was able to twist the powers conferred upon Danzig to her

own ends and finally to upset the whole settlement by violence.