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*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
pour le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], December 5, 1962

CONGO – REQUESTS FOR MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

Attached are copies of telegrams 3229 of November 1<sup>†</sup> and 3240 of November 2, 1962,<sup>†</sup> in which our mission in Washington reported that the U.S. authorities would like to have our views concerning the possibility of providing assistance in modernizing and training the Congolese Armed Forces. The same subject was raised recently by General Mobutu in Leopoldville, as reported in paragraph 2 of our mission's attached telegram 194 of November 23 (amended copy).<sup>†</sup>

2. You will recall that the Cabinet agreed on January 26, 1962 that it was not possible to make available 20 officers with the qualifications and experience required for such a task, as requested by the Acting Secretary-General. U Thant was informed on January 30; on February 1 he replied by asking Canada to provide any number of officers that could be spared and indicated that officers who were retired, on the inactive list or in the reserve would be acceptable. You asked the Minister of National Defence to look into this revised request and on April 5 you were able to inform U Thant that it had been found that Canada could make available six or seven French-speaking officers who were not on the active list to assist in the training of the Congolese Armed Forces. The Permanent Mission informed us subsequently that the Acting Secretary-General was most grateful for our offer but that the plans for the provision of a U.N. Training Cadre had been put in cold storage on account of a difference of opinion between Prime Minister Adoula and General Mobutu.

3. We have always agreed in the past with the U.N. assessment that the modernization and retraining of the Congolese Army was one of the prerequisites of the re-establishment of peace and order in that country. We have always considered also that any military assistance to the Congo should be directed by and through the U.N. We have made this clear to the Congolese and Ghanaian leaders who have broached this subject with us in the past. This policy was based on the recommendations of the Security Council and also on our assessment that unless assistance was administered by the U.N. it would be open to criticism as a Western-sponsored move and would provide a pretext for military assistance proposals from the Soviet Bloc. For these reasons, I would be chary of openly endorsing General Mobutu's or even the U.S. "proposals" unless we had more details on the role which is envisaged for the U.N. in these schemes. In this connection I note that Washington's telegram 3229 reports that U.S. officials are contemplating the possibility of fulfilling all the requirements through bilateral arrangements rather than under the executive direction of the U.N. In a subsequent telephone conversation, however, our mission in Washington has made it clear that the State Department had no intention of bypassing the U.N. and wished simply to engage in direct negotiations with other countries in order to expedite the matter.

4. It may be that the U.N. has lost interest in assuming the executive direction of such a scheme and it must be recognized that the Congolese themselves may not be willing to accept a programme in which the U.N. would be responsible for the major share of the executive direction. You will recall that General Mobutu has expressed great misgivings on past U.N. "hodgepodge" proposals. He considered, and I believe that there is something to be said in