

we say "Security through disarmament" and the others say "Disarmament after security", the Protocol provided for security and disarmament as component parts of one process. It was the most ambitious political document in world history, and it was rejected by Ramsay MacDonald's successors and by the British Dominions. True, its arbitration provisions have since been adopted, but its mutual solidarity concept remains to confront us next February in Geneva. We shall say once again: "Disarm and you will be more secure." They will answer: "You may be right, but if we yield to your exhortations, and if one of us fall a victim to a lawless neighbour, can we be sure that you will come immediately and effectively to the rescue?" It is a plain, straightforward, business-like proposition. At least it seems so to them. If our delegates to Geneva could only respond unhesitatingly in the affirmative, we should secure a Disarmament Convention after our own heart. If, however, they were obliged to avoid the issue and to content themselves once again with preaching at unregenerate Europeans and Asiatics, then indeed the Conference would prove but one more disappointment to humanity. The Sino-Japanese incident has greatly strengthened the logical position of those who advocate a League that is powerful as well as conciliatory. If all States Members could rise to the conception of a guaranteed solidarity among them, it is morally certain that no potential aggressor would ever dare defy them and thus bring upon his country financial ruin and economic isolation, not to speak of the possibility of