

NATO

erratic from place to place? Is it really communism that is at the bottom of the threat to our security? Is it in fact, and I intend no pun, a red herring dragged across in front of us to distract our attention from the vital things, the basically dangerous things that do indeed threaten our security, those six devils we all have confronted from time to time in our concern as men in public office: hunger and disease, fear and despair, oppression and corruption?

Where and how have we recognized these as the real threats to our national security? If we try to delude ourselves into believing that these particular threats to our security have somehow diminished and gone into a state of unimportance, we are not recognizing the facts. We know only too well from reading our daily newspapers that the enemy has grown. The threat is not only real, it is increasing. It is a genuine threat to each and every member of this house and to each and every home in this country that we represent.

How can we say, as we so often do, that we are concerned about maintaining our national security if we do not address ourselves to these basic threats? In the beginning of this speech when I indicated the three broad areas of national security, I mentioned that the first one was maintaining security at home. How have we maintained harmony and peace at home over the decades? We have not done so with armies and ammunition, but through concern for our fellowmen. A public figure of our time has indicated that the new name for peace in our time is, and must be, development. We have known it all along. We have just not been willing to recognize it sufficiently. If we forget it in 1969 and the 1970's in this one world, we forget it in our peril.

Mr. Alastair Gillespie (Etobicoke): Mr. Speaker, in speaking to this motion I wish to make it quite clear that I support the motion; that I interpret "planned and phased reduction" to mean reduction and re-arrangement, not to mean the effective withdrawal of our forces from Europe at this time as some hon. members opposite have done; that it means we will continue in Europe beyond the end of 1969 but on a reduced and different basis, a basis to be discussed with our allies.

I would like to deal with three points and to underline those three points. The first is that conditions are changing and that we must adapt to, indeed, anticipate change. More than that we should try to bring about the kind of change that we think is needed.

[Mr. MacDonald (Egmont).]

We should not react passively but we should anticipate actively.

The second is that NATO is not just a military alliance. It is a political alliance with political objectives. Similarly, Canada as a participant in NATO participates in more than just a military way. Membership gives a country political benefits, and resident membership in the club provides just that many more.

Third, the decision to re-examine our nuclear role in Europe is timely and one which I hope will lead us to reject nuclear weapons as part of our armaments, after discussion with our allies.

I fear some of the things that the last speaker mentioned. I fear perhaps more than anything else miscalculation or accident. I fear misunderstanding, and misunderstandings will develop if there is not a clear intention on the part of the western alliance.

In speaking to these three points, I think it is important that we recognize the foreign policy framework within which our NATO posture must operate. First, defence policy should be a servant and not the master. This debate should have taken place before now. It should have taken place at the time of the unification debate, at that time or before it. It is long overdue.

Second, we should see our foreign policy objectives as a whole, not as component parts. Too often there is a tendency to look at foreign policy in terms of military objectives, set aside from cultural or political objectives, or set aside from trade objectives. In my view, we should examine each of our foreign initiatives against each of these tests. For instance, how does NATO serve our political objectives? How does it meet the test of our cultural or national identity objectives, and our trade objectives? In my view, it meets them all, and meets them well.

In foreign policy terms, obviously our primary role is a security one in NATO. We believe in collective security and in maintaining the stability of the world order; but it is also important that we see security not just in these military terms, not just in terms of survival, but that we see security in terms of economic strength and political understanding, in terms of composing national interests and ambitions.

Those within the alliance have trade objectives and objectives of national identity, and we are no different. Similarly, our trade interests in Europe are important to our economic health, which in turn determines our