

take the issue to the Commission. If the Commission determines that the situation warrants it, it may ask the IAEA to undertake an OSI and may send representatives as part of the inspection team. Based on the IAEA's report, the Commission will determine whether a treaty violation has occurred. If the Commission reaches such a conclusion, the treaty parties will meet in extraordinary session. If necessary, the session may decide to pass the matter to the African Union for further action. The AU may, in turn, decide to pass the matter to the UN Security Council.

South-East Asia

The 1995 Treaty of Bangkok also establishes a commission to oversee implementation. It comprises representatives from all parties and meets as necessary. The Commission has an Executive Committee charged with overseeing the verification process, considering requests for consultation and clarification and fact-finding. Parties have the right to seek clarification from another party about possible non-compliance or request the Executive Committee's assistance. States may ask the Executive Committee to send a fact-finding mission to another party's territory if there is a possible non-compliance situation. If the Executive Committee determines that a violation has occurred, the non-compliant state will be required to bring itself into compliance. If it does not, a meeting of the Commission may submit the issue to the IAEA, the UN Security Council or the UN General Assembly for further action.

Central Asia

The 2002 Treaty of Samarkand, which has not yet entered into force, creates a nuclear-weapon free zone among the former Soviet republics of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It also requires states parties to uphold nuclear security and safety standards at least as effective as those elaborated in the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Annual consultative meetings are envisaged, along with extraordinary meetings if requested by any party, in order to 'review compliance or other questions related to ... implementation'. Otherwise the treaty is silent on how non-compliance is to be handled.

Chemical Weapons

The principal disarmament agreement in the chemical weapons (CW) area is now the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). A previous treaty banning the use of chemical and biological weapons, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, remains in force but it had no verification and compliance mechanisms. What was intended to be a temporary verification mechanism for the Protocol was initiated by the UN General Assembly in 1982. However, given the existence of a comprehensive verification regime for chemical weapons—the CWC's Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)—the current state of the Secretary-General's mechanism will only be considered in the section relating to biological weapons below. The role of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC in chemical and biological weapons verification in Iraq will be discussed in the section on those two mechanisms, also below.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1997, prohibits states from using, developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling or retaining chemical weapons, and from