

operandi in the UN's existing organization.

The general problem of "fitting in" is no less important. The United Nations, like all complex organizations, is an arena in which several internal contests take place concurrently. There are, of course, bureaucratic struggles among UN elements for attention, special interests, resources and preferred outcomes. These competitions may become conflicts, or they may simply appear as more or less co-operative attempts to reconcile contending institutional demands. Nevertheless, conflict (also known as "bureaucratic politics") is an inevitable aspect of organization, and the currency of these conflicts is usually information. Therefore, CITA can expect to meet resistance from inside the established UN, because it will compete for interests and resources and because it will presumably have control of a rich flow of information.

So-called "turf battles" should not defeat or cripple CITA. Its entry into the UN structure and its acceptance by managers can be eased by three types of related activities. First, the benefits to managers and senior officials in the UN ought to be emphasized. If senior officials are convinced of the unit's value, other problems should be quickly redressed. Second, CITA — along the lines described above — must be seen to be an addition to the present operating scheme of the UN and not as a usurper of established positions. Explaining CITA's policy relevance, therefore, must be a major first step. Third, CITA must arrive at the UN in possession of sufficient assets to begin a useful service. Eventually, the demonstrated success of CITA might convince the Secretary-General to rationalize his organization and to reallocate resources between departments of the Secretariat and CITA. If, however, proponents of CITA suggested that existing departments would be expected to provide the personnel for this new unit immediately, then its chances for internal acceptance would be low. Therefore, a concrete plan to establish CITA must include provisions for the resources necessary to install, operate and maintain CITA, at least for a medium-term trial period.

The Relationship of CITA with Existing Regimes

Several of the agencies which now exist for the purposes of implementing and verifying arms control treaties and agreements to curb proliferation are already in the business of collecting and analyzing information. The scope of each of these is confined to the subject, to the geographical areas defined by the relevant treaty or agreement, and to their membership (i.e., they are treaty-specific).

The IAEA collects information relevant to nuclear materials and technology from the states parties to the NPT. The London Nuclear Suppliers' Group surveys transfers from its members to the rest of the world. Of greatest concern, however, may be the nuclear activities of those states which are not members of these regimes.

The OPCW will be performing a function analogous to that of the IAEA, but for chemical weapons in the states which are now or will be members of the CWC, with the Australia Group concentrating on information relevant to transfers of materials or technology between its own limited number of members and recipient states. But countries that have chosen not to sign the CWC are the most likely to raise suspicions regarding their intentions to develop arsenals of chemical weapons.

The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty involves OSIs conducted by individual nations and coordinated by the NATO Verification Implementation and Coordination Staff, as well as data exchanges and notifications of planned military activity. While the Treaty has a Joint Consultative Group, this is not a multilateral clearing house for information. Similarly, the Open Skies Treaty authorizes overflights mainly conducted by individual states among its signatories. It has an Open Skies Consultative Committee, but this does not function as an information centre. CITA could perform this function for either regime, conducting data collection and imagery interpretation.

