

The evidence is that Iraq in 1990-91 did suffer from the blockade of food supplies. Following the war a study conducted by the Harvard School of Public Health, using statistics from house to house surveys, concluded that infantile mortality rates had more than tripled, to 80 per 1000, as a result of the war and revolt. An estimated 46,900 children under 5 died in Iraq between January and August 1991, in excess of the peacetime expectation of infantile mortality.¹⁴ This suffering, however, did not bring the Iraqi government to change its policies. The conclusion that food control was not an effective means of coercing the Iraqi government is reinforced by its decision not to take advantage of Security Council Resolution 706 of 15 August 1991 which partly lifted the control of exports, permitting Iraq to sell \$1.6 billion worth of oil to pay for essential supplies, providing international humanitarian organizations were given control of distribution.

All the inclusion of food control in the United Nations sanctions against Iraq served to do was to undermine the consensus which existed as to the need to respond to aggression. Although the protests of the ambassadors of Cuba, the Yemen, and Colombia were dismissed by the great powers, they found ready echoes in public opinion. Following the liberation of Kuwait, the Security Council eliminated controls on food shipment to Iraq, without, however, being able to put an end to the famine.¹⁵

The sanctions imposed on Haiti by the Organization of American States, and later by the United Nations, have not included a blockade of food, but Haitian poverty was so exacerbated by the sanctions that famine has resulted, killing 1000 young children in Haiti per month. Famine, however, proved to have little capacity to persuade the illegal Haitian regime to comply with United Nations resolutions.¹⁶

It would be wrong, however, to dismiss entirely the capacity of food control to influence the behaviour of weakened states, providing the political consequences can be

¹⁴ The destruction of sanitation systems by direct bombing was one of the main causes of the loss of life, but the highest mortality rates were in the Kurdish north of Iraq followed by the Shiite south. In neither area was bombing extensive and the higher death rate must have been caused by the revolts against the Baathist regime, and by the effects of the sanctions which the residents of Baghdad were better able to offset because of their access to the black economy. Alberto Archerio, et al., "The Effect of the Gulf War on Infant and Child Mortality in Iraq," New England Journal of Medicine, 23 September 1992 (1992;327:931-6); and see Globe and Mail, 22 October 1991 and 24 September 1992.

¹⁵ SC Resolution 687, 22 March 1991. See: United States Congress, House of Representatives International task Force Select Committee on Hunger, 1 August 1991.

¹⁶ "Sanctions and Spoons," Time, 22 November 1993, p. 32.. Statistics are derived from a study by the Harvard University Center for Population and Development Studies.