
Part 3. Summary and Conclusions

Some Lessons from the IAEA's Experience

A variety of "lessons" may be suggested from a consideration of the IAEA's experience as a verification organization. These include not only what phenomena have or have not been problems for the Agency but also how and with what degree of success it has dealt with them. Problems, of course, are more readily visible, while success is often apparent only in comparison with other organizations or by considering what did not happen. What follows is an attempt to distil at least some elements along these lines from the body of this study. The divisions used below are an attempt to organize (in some cases to reorganize) the material usefully, but they are to some degree arbitrary.

Broad Objectives, Tasks and Threat Coverage

1. Verification by an international agency in sensitive areas of state activity, through the use of on-site inspection and associated intrusive techniques of materials accounting, instrumentation, etc., is not inherently infeasible. However, its specific viability and mechanisms will vary from one context to another. The broad problems to be dealt with by a verification agency and its objectives with respect to those problems must be clearly defined and the implications of various mechanisms to deal with those problems must be carefully considered.
2. Both the separation and the combination of the broad objectives of disarmament and of non-proliferation (in the horizontal sense) may have advantages and disadvantages. Pursuing non-proliferation alone may raise charges of inequity and of support for the states that already have the weapons. Pursuing disarmament alone could raise problems in a non-universal agreement, if non-parties possessed or acquired and used the weapons. Pursuing both disarmament and non-proliferation would reduce or avoid some of these problems, but one would continue to face problems resulting from possible transfers and exports of sensitive materials to non-parties.
3. The basic problem of non-proliferation, whether or not the sole focus of an agreement, may be defined in at least two ways: end-uses or latent proliferation. The first requires an ability to make meaningful distinctions among desired and undesired uses, and to operationalize these through controls. This is the route the Agency has taken. Such an approach limits the threats which the Agency covers in its safeguards systems, and thus the assurances it can offer even if its systems are

