

- treat Vietnam as a full member of La Francophonie and use that organization to the fullest extent possible as a means of resuming regular contacts with Vietnam.

This is a most important point since the fact that the two countries have use of the French language in common should be a great advantage and should make any improvement in relations easy to justify to Canada's allies. This approach would be all the easier and more acceptable since it would probably be initiated by Quebec and need not therefore weaken Ottawa's position *vis-à-vis* its allies. The contacts which were made in Quebec, at the Francophone Summit of September 1987, between the representatives of Ottawa and Quebec and those of Vietnam, could serve as a starting point for various initiatives of this kind. The possibility of increased contacts has been frequently mentioned in the course of several meetings in Hanoi between the author and Vietnamese representatives. The fact that the Vietnamese authorities are interested in increased contacts has been shown by the detailed consideration given to exchange programmes and to the nature of the delegations which could be exchanged without doing damage to Canada's official position regarding Vietnam. Any initiative of this kind should come from Quebec, and should take place in the framework of La Francophonie which will clarify the scope and limits of the proposed exchanges. Agreements could quickly be put in place covering different subjects such as the teaching of French, health, medicine, and scientific training for Vietnamese students in Quebec universities, and these arrangements could easily be cancelled if it turned out that such positive gestures were being exploited for political purposes.

By taking such positive initiatives while continuing to remain firm in its approach to Vietnam, Canada would make it abundantly clear that it attaches great importance to Southeast Asia. Its policy would be seen as less passive and less an echo of that of Washington, and it would be assured of a more desirable role in any wider negotiations. By proclaiming its intentions in this way, Canadian policy would be less dependent on the turn of events in Indochina. Canada would also avoid being relegated to a position where it always appears to be reacting and adjusting to the policies of others.