

rest in the knowledge that these weapons have been truly banished.

The next article in the United States draft convention, article XI, authorizes ad hoc on-site inspections. Such inspections may be made of all locations that are not covered by article X. A party must consent to an ad hoc inspection requested by the Consultative Committee except for the most exceptional reasons, which must be explained. Upon consideration the Committee may send the party another request, and if this is also refused, the Security Council would immediately be informed.

The convention would also require a number of detailed provisions for its implementation, which we propose to place in annexes to the main text. These annexes would be integral parts of the convention. Accordingly, in addition to the draft convention which was presented last week, the United States also presented its detailed views on the contents of these annexes.

Annex I provides many details concerning the Consultative Committee, including provisions for the working of that Committee. It also contains provisions for the creation of an Executive Council, fact-finding panel, and a technical secretariat, as well as provisions for the convening of special meetings of the Committee.

Annex II provides detailed views on verification. Section A of this annex stipulates the detailed information that would have to be provided in the various declarations required by the convention, such as the declarations concerning chemical weapons, production facilities, and destruction activities. Section B of annex II is concerned with procedures for on-site verification, including inspections. It provides detailed rules for on-site inspections and the use of on-site monitoring equipment, and provides rules to protect the rights of both inspectors and host States. It also provides for the inspection and monitoring of chemical weapons, production facilities, protective activities and destruction activities. Finally, this section stipulates criteria to be used by the Consultative Committee in evaluating requests for ad hoc inspections.

Annex III provides the basis for the three schedules which list the chemicals that have legitimate uses but which also pose a risk of diversion to chemical weapons purposes. In addition, there is a fourth schedule, embodying parts of document CD/CW/WP.30, to specify methods for measuring the toxicity of chemicals.

I also wish to draw attention to two actions which should be taken before the convention can enter into force. First, upon signature, every State should declare whether chemical weapons or production facilities are under its control anywhere or located within its territory. In fact, many States have already made such statements, including the United States. We would urge others to do so as well. Second, there should be a preparatory commission convened once the convention is open for signature to plan for the implementation of the convention, but separate from it.

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The latest, I would say, graphic example of this attitude on the part of the United States to arms-limitation and disarmament issues is the broadly-publicized draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons submitted by the United States delegation on 18 April 1984. Contrary to all promises, even if there are some changes in the obstructionist position of the United States on a chemical-weapons ban, they are in no way for the better. Previously, in order to bar the conclusion of an agreement on a chemical-weapon ban the United States insisted on a verification system under which other States should at the first request allow foreign inspectors access to any chemical facility regardless of whether or not it has anything to do with the production of chemical weapons. Now Washington proposes that States should agree in advance and unconditionally to unimpeded access of foreign inspectors "anywhere and at any time".