

by a Parliamentary delegation. On March 21 he reported on his visit to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the House of Commons.

On that occasion as well as when he announced the decision on continued Canadian participation in the ICCS in the House of Commons on March 27, the Secretary of State for External Affairs reviewed the conclusions that he had drawn from his visit to Viet-Nam. He said that notwithstanding the best efforts of the Canadian Delegation, the ICCS was not performing the tasks assigned to it under the cease-fire Agreement. (Progress reports to the Department of External Affairs by the Canadian Delegation are appended.) There had been thousands of incidents since the Agreement, some involving large-scale operations, of which only a few had led to requests for investigation by the Commission; a very small number of Commission reports had emerged. Some of the essential pieces of the cease-fire machinery had not yet been put into place, such as the deployment of the Four-Party and Two-Party JMCs, and the cease-fire was not being observed. However, the situation, while serious, was nevertheless an enormous improvement over that existing before the cease-fire. American and Vietnamese prisoners-of-war were being released and the last of the United States forces in Viet-Nam would soon depart. The role which the ICCS had played in these developments was justification enough for its existence.

On the question of Canada's future participation in the ICCS, the talks the Secretary of State for External Affairs had with the leaders of the RVN and the DRVN during his trip to the region revealed that they were in general agreement that Canada should continue to serve. They expressed the belief that Canada's early departure would have far-reaching consequences. Their views were not dissimilar to those expressed by a number of countries, including the United States, Great Britain, China and Japan that whether or not the ICCS functioned according to the provisions of the Agreement, its real value lay in the fact that it was an integral part of the Agreement. It was argued that the Commission provided an international presence as an indication that the world community remained involved in the Viet-Nam situation. The Secretary of State for External Affairs was not convinced that the ICCS played such a psychological role in the thinking of the Vietnamese nor did he consider that Canada should be expected to play this part over a protracted period.

In Hanoi, the leaders of the DRVN replied to all questions by reference to the terms of the Agreement, which they appeared to regard as sacrosanct; they said that they intended to strictly and scrupulously implement them and that they expected everyone else to do the same. In the opinion of the Secretary of State for External Affairs they had their own interpretation of precisely what each article meant and this added up to either a peacefully