

The Bazaar

THEY RECEIVED THE WORD WITH ALL READINESS OF MIND, AND SEARCHED THE SCRIPTURES DAILY, WHETHER THOSE THINGS WERE SO.—ACTS, xviii.

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WHY DOES THE SUN GO DOWN?

Why does the sun go down?
Why infant lips exclaim,
As they gaze on the departing orb,
While heaven seems wrapt in flame,
It goes to cheer another sphere,
Make other hills look bright,
And chase away, from distant realms,
The hovering shades of night.

Why does the sun go down?
Perchance thou soon may'st say,
As the foul bright dreams of childhood's years
Are vanishing away,
Those fairy dreams desert thee now,
And their magic charms are riven,
To show the earth is at best but dark,
And light proceeds from heaven.

Why does the sun go down?
Perhaps thou may'st whisper too,
As the warmer beams of youthful love
Are fitting fast from view,
To bid thee fix thy heart on things
Beyond the gulf of time,
And never expect enduring bliss,
In the earth's ungenial clime.

Why does the sun go down?
Thou may'st ask in deeper gloom,
When the hand that writes these verses now,
Is laid in the silent tomb;
And O may he see this sacred truth
Stamp'd on every heart that reads—
It does but quit the scene awhile,
In glory to rise again!

Thomas Ruge.

RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.

A Review of "Scriptural Principles, as applied to Religious Societies," by Walter Farquhar Hook, D. D., *Four of Leeds, London, 1811.* In the "Churchman's Monthly Review," March, 1841.

Dr. Hook enters his tract, "Scriptural Principles," and as one of these scriptural principles, he declares the necessity, to form a Church Society, of the entire concurrence of "the Archbishops, and all the Bishops of both provinces." A single objector among the prelates would take any society out of his rule, and make it "no Church Society." Yet the Society for Propagating the Gospel, at its first formation, had not the patronage of one-half of the bench of Bishops. Nor, in forty years after, had it the concurrence of the entire Bench. As to the Christian Knowledge Society, we have already seen, that, instead of "placing the diocesan in his right position," the by-laws of that society only provided that a Bishop might be elected if proposed, without making the declaration required of other persons, of loyalty and allegiance.

But what is most extraordinary in the whole affair, is the excessive extent to which the right of private judgment is carried, by such reasoners as Dr. Hook and Dr. Molesworth. They first appear to lay down a principle, that "nothing is to be done without the Bishop." We meet them on their own grounds, and say, Come, then, and support the Pastoral Aid Society, and the Church Missionary Society, both of which are approved and recommended by *various* diocesan, the Bishops of Ripon and Chester.

But no, says Dr. Hook, "Bishops are only, like ourselves, fallible men, and may err occasionally." Granted, good Doctor, but then what becomes of your principle, "Do nothing without the Bishop?" Who is to be the judge, whether you, Drs. Hook and Molesworth, or your spiritual Fathers in God, and seniors in the Church, the Bishops of Ripon and Chester, are in the wrong?

"We ourselves," answers Dr. Hook. "In deciding whether a society is conducted on Church principles, it is not to the diocesan, but to the society itself, that we are to refer."—(p. 11.)

To the society itself? Is it meant that you are to ask the Pastoral Aid Society, for instance, whether or not it is a Church Society, and to be governed by its reply? Of course not. But where, then, is the judge, where is the arbiter, by whom the question of churchmanship is to be decided? It is not to be the diocesan; it is not to be the society itself. Who, then, is it to be?

It is to be Dr. Hook himself. This is the real drift of his pamphlet. "It is not to the diocesan, but to the society itself that we are to refer. And the question is not merely whether the diocesan belongs to it, but also whether the society places the diocesan in his right position. We are to vindicate the rights of the diocesan, even though the diocesan himself neglect them," &c.—(p. 12.)

But by what rule, by what standard, are we to judge when it is that "the diocesan neglects his own rights?" The Bishop's own opinion is set aside; and the opinion of the society itself (which is in dispute) of course goes for nothing; and the Church, in her Articles and Canons, is wholly silent. Where, then, is the rule, the law, the standard, by which the right and wrong between Dr. Hook, and the Bishop of Ripon, between Drs. Molesworth and the Bishop of Chester, is to be ascertained? Clearly, nowhere; but in Dr. Hook's own private judgment; his own individual opinion. "It is not to the diocesan, but to the society itself that we are to refer. The question is not merely whether the diocesan belongs to it, but also whether the society places the diocesan in his right position." (That is, in what we choose to call "his right position.") "We are to vindicate the rights of the diocesan, even though the diocesan himself neglect them." (Of course "we" must be understood to mean the society itself.) "It is not to the diocesan, but to the society itself that we are to refer. The question is not merely whether the diocesan belongs to it, but also whether the society places the diocesan in his right position." (That is, in what we choose to call "his right position.") "We are to vindicate the rights of the diocesan, even though the diocesan himself neglect them." (Of course "we" must be understood to mean the society itself.) "It is not to the diocesan, but to the society itself that we are to refer. The question is not merely whether the diocesan belongs to it, but also whether the society places the diocesan in his right position." (That is, in what we choose to call "his right position.") "We are to vindicate the rights of the diocesan, even though the diocesan himself neglect them." (Of course "we" must be understood to mean the society itself.)

But who invested Dr. Hook with this authority, to make laws for Bishops and Archbishops? Laws, too, far more stringent and intolerant than the Church ever did, or ever could, make for herself. He himself admits, that if the Church were in more happy circumstances, all these questions would be decided in Convocation. In Convocation, then, would the question be debated,—whether such a society—the Church Missionary, for instance, or the Church Pastoral Aid—should be recognized as an organ of the Church of England. But to carry the affirmative, not the votes of "both the Archbishops and all the Bishops" would be needed; and a bare majority would be enough. Nor would a majority of the whole episcopal Bench be required; the larger half of those present would suffice. Eight prelates, out of fifteen present, or ten out of nineteen, would fully carry the recognition. How monstrous, then, for any single incumbent to erect himself into a national synod, or even more; and to pronounce, *ex cathedra*, that not even twenty prelates concurring could make a society a Church Society;—when the Convocation, if it met to-morrow, would admit any society to that rank, which could gain the votes of the larger number of the prelates who happened to be in attendance.

We reprobate Dr. Hook's canons, then, because they are *ex cathedra*, and have not a shadow of support, either from scripture or the Church. To erect a "scriptural principle" that a society is not a Church Society, except both the Archbishops are at its head,—when Scripture knows nothing of such an officer as an Archbishop,—is obviously absurd. The most offensive point, however, in Dr. Hook's system, is that it broadly and unreservedly censures all that the Church and her prelates have been doing for the last hundred and thirty years. Only carry out, in strictness, his three canons, and the result is, that there is not, never was, and probably never will be, a "Church Society;" but that our prelates have been encouraging and supporting institutions from which "churchmen ought to have withheld their support." Let us specify an instance or two of this kind.

We find among the supporters of the Naval and Military Bible Society, both the English Archbishops. So far all is well, and according to Dr. Hook's rule. But if we look a little further, we find that "the society" does not "place these prelates in a right position." The Patron of the Society is a layman. The President is also a layman. Descending to the Vice-Presidents, we find, first, the two Archbishops, then, nine lay Peers, and then, four Bishops, and only four! Clearly, therefore, their Graces of Canterbury and York fall under Dr. Hook's censure. The society is not "a Church Society;" it is one "from which we ought to withhold our support." We must vindicate the rights of our Archbishops, "even though those prelates themselves neglect them."

But we may take another case. Here is the Report of the Society for the Conversion of the Negro Slaves in the British West Indies, for 1827 (the last which has fallen into our hands). In it we find that the Bishop of London is "President;" that the Bishops of Durham, Landaff, Jamaica, and Barbadoes are "Vice-Presidents;" and that the Bishops of Winchester, Chester, and Chichester are "Governors." Very probably other names may have been added since 1827, but we have not seen a later Report; nor would subsequent improvements alter Dr. Hook's censure of the acts of that year. According to his system, he must maintain that these Bishops,—aye, even Dr. Van Mildert himself, that rigid churchman, who was among their number,—were all guilty of a violation of "Church principles;"—establishing a fresh precedent of an institution countenanced by neither of the Primates, nor by even one-half of the episcopal bench:—a society which "cannot be called a Church Society," and which yet has eight prelates at its head!

But we may pass on to higher authorities than these. The Society for Propagating the Gospel were these "Church principles" of Dr. Hook's known or regarded in its formation? Not in the least! In the year 1701 the Sovereign issues his charter, constituting *seven* only of the prelates of the Church, together with a number of laymen whose names are given, a Society for the purposes therein described. By this charter, under which the society still exists and acts, the members are enjoined to meet on a certain day in every year, then to elect a president. Not the least obligation is imposed of electing an Archbishop or Bishop, or any other clerical person. A layman is as eligible for the office as the Primate himself. Lord Melbourne or Lord Ellenborough, or Sir John Lubbock might be made President this very next year. That the choice generally falls on the Archbishop of Canterbury is a circumstance arising out of the mere will of the individual members for the time being, and not at all from any law or original proviso of the society's constitution. The prelates of the Church are admitted by election, not assigned a place at the head of the institution as matter of right. The *Collection of Papers*, printed by the society in 1706, states that since the formation of the society the following Bishops had been elected members:—Durham, Winchester, Landaff, Exeter, Sarum, Litchfield, Norwich, Peterborough, Bristol, Lincoln, and Oxford. At least four, then, and probably a larger number, of the prelates of

the Church, were not even members of the society, and the like deficiency existed for many years after. This society, therefore, utterly fails to answer Dr. Hook's requirements. It was not placed "under the superintendence of the Archbishops and all the Bishops of both provinces of the Church of England;" nor did it "place the diocesan in their right position;" inasmuch as it left them to be admitted or rejected, by the votes of a mixed body of clergy and laity.

And precisely the same censure might be passed on the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. This society was, perhaps, more irregular than any other known institution of a similar class, in its original formation. We have seen that it arose from a meeting of certain laymen, who assembled for the purpose of praying, singing psalms, and exhorting each other. We may add, that in this society, as in the last-named, a Bishop was only admitted on the formal proposition of two members, and by the order of the ballot. And what is still worse, up to 1813, at least, and probably still later, it was not even needed to be a member of the Church of England, to become one of this society! In its papers published in that year, the form of declaration to be made by the persons proposing a new member only alluded to be "a member of the Church of England,"—a description which would have admitted Matthew Henry, Dabridge, and half the Wesleyans of the present day!

But we cannot agree thus to condemn all that the Church has been doing, from 1701 downwards, merely to embrace a few hot-headed controversialists of the present day to excommunicate the Church Missionary and Church Pastoral Aid Societies. Dr. Hook's canons are inadmissible. We must cease from judging and anathematizing one another, and fall back upon the apostolic rule:—"One man esteemeth one day above another; another esteemeth every day alike: Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind." Neither Dr. Hook, nor any other Presbyter of our Church, has any authority to impose laws upon our consciences, which he cannot show to us, *clearly written down*, either in Scripture or in the standards of our Church. The latter, as Dr. Hook by his omission of all reference to them confesses, are silent upon the present subject. The former, from which, indeed, Dr. Hook professes to deduce his "principles,"—will no more support his conclusions than they would support Popery itself. "A man that is an Heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject." This injunction, addressed by St. Paul to a Bishop is seriously referred to, by Dr. Hook, to prove that we, who are not Bishops, ought to "reject" from our religious societies the aid of those who are not heretics; who hold the same creeds with ourselves; and who are, as Mr. Gladstone confesses, scarcely to be called schismatics. With all our respect for the Vicar of Leeds, we must place this arbitrary citing of Scripture among those "weddings," and "private interpretations," against which we are cautioned. Some better reasoning, some clearer command from God's word, must be advanced, before we can give up that "liberty" which the great Apostle so repeatedly enjoins us to retain.

PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

From a Lecture by the Rev. W. Williams, M. A., Vicar of St. Bartholomew Hyde, Winchester.

What more anxious inquiry can there be for every one who is alive to his own responsibility before God than this: What means shall he use, that he may learn rightly the truth of God? Is it really true, as some assert, that he must be guided wholly by certain other parties? or, on the contrary, is he allowed to exercise his own discretion in this most momentous investigation, on which depends the praise or the blame that will attach to himself, individually, at the judgment-seat of Christ? In other words, is he invested with the right of private judgment on those principles, in which he is so deeply interested through his personal responsibility?

It may be as well at the outset of our argument, to explain what is meant by the term, responsibility. It implies, that God will call man to an account for his whole character and conduct, and "will render to every man according to his deeds." This then is responsibility; and that man is so responsible as a truth which is not only written or implied in every page of Scripture, but which speaks with a living voice in the conscience of every individual. The bold assertion and plausible sophistries by which men may sometimes try to deceive themselves, and to silence those who reprove them, cannot banish their own innate conviction of this immutable fact; it lives in the consciousness with a strong, enduring life, interspersed with the very being of the spirit itself. Every man feels himself to be responsible upon the testimony of his own conscience; but he who has the Bible in his hand, knows himself to be so upon the testimony of God. As it is for such as these we write, we would merely remind the reader of the solemn assertion of the apostle, "Every one of us shall give account of himself to God;" and that the Word of God does in a measure continually anticipate that judgment, and award praise or blame to the different classes of persons of whom it speaks; thereby distinctly intimating their responsibility in the sight of Him who "from the place of His habitation looketh upon all

the inhabitants of the earth; who fashioneth their hearts alike, and considereth their works."

It must moreover be observed, that this responsibility is manifestly *personal*; by which is meant, that the obligation lying upon man, is that he should answer in *his own person*; that the praise or blame due to his rectitude or the contrary, attaches to *himself*. It may indeed attach in some measure to others besides himself, to those who have directly or indirectly influenced him for good or evil, but it most certainly attaches to himself first of all; in his own person he is accountable before God: for it is written, "every man shall give account of himself;" and again, "let every man prove his own work, and then shall he have rejoicing in himself, and not in another; for every man shall bear his own burden." Our responsibility therefore is strictly personal. We cannot shift it off upon another. Every individual in the whole human family will, in respect of the account he has to give, stand as isolated at the bar of God as if no other had ever lived.

Having thus explained the nature of the responsibility of which we speak, and having shown that the Word of God agrees with the most solemn distinctness that it is the inalienable condition of every human being, we go on to consider, now, the foundation on which it rests. What are the circumstances which are absolutely requisite to create this condition, or in other words, what there can be so personal responsibility? We are far from intending to attempt to give a full answer to this question; it is by no means decided for the purpose in hand; and however interesting a subject for investigation, it would lead us into too wide a field of thought, at a time when the attention of the reader ought to be concentrated on one single point in the inquiry.

Omitting therefore any notice of whatever other things may be thought necessary to constitute the responsibility of any individual, we confine ourselves to the plain and simple fact, that except a man know, or have the opportunity of knowing, what is right or what is wrong, he cannot be justly called to an account. If indeed he will not take advantage of it, he stands equally condemned, as if knowing to do good, he did it not, because his ignorance is voluntary, and therefore in fact his doing wrong through ignorance, is voluntary also. But where no opportunity exists of acquiring the knowledge of right and wrong, all things must be the same to him, because he has no means of detecting any moral difference between them; and therefore his choice of one or the other *can* have no respect to its morality or immorality; and consequently, the morality or immorality of his choice can in no way effect his condemnation or otherwise. Hence if we are taught of God that man is responsible before Him, it is distinctly implied, that in God's sight he possesses the means of learning, in some degree at least, what true rectitude is. Moreover it may be added, that if every one is responsible in his own person, and no one in the person of another, then each must individually possess for himself these means of acquiring moral knowledge.

We may infer, then, from the fact of man's personal responsibility, that God has communicated to him some measure of truth, and at the same time has given to each the power of using that communication for his own direction. For, except the light shine upon his path, the wayfaring man is not to blame if he err therein; or if, while the light shines for others, his eyes be closed to it, and that not by his own act, he is equally safe from any merited condemnation. Hence there must belong to every accountable being both a light to direct and also an aptness to apprehend its indications, and so to judge rightly of the objects on which it falls; for if we have not these, then have we no means of discerning right from wrong—no opportunity of knowing to do good—and so no just liability to the imputation of sin, if we do it not; and thus the Scripture itself asserts, "sin is not imputed where there is no law."

What communication of truth then has God made to man, which thus goes to constitute his personal responsibility? As it is the testimony of God that we have affirmed the responsibility itself, so let us learn from Him on what that responsibility rests. We gather from Scripture in the first place that there is in every man that natural sense of right which we call the light of conscience; it is recognised by St. Paul in these words, "When the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, they are not lawless, because they have not the law, they do by nature the things contained in the law, which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." The same divine communication is likewise alluded to by St. John, "That was the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." The former of these passages, it is to be observed, not only bears witness to the existence of the light of conscience, but shows that God who has given it considers it as making man responsible; for it is there spoken of as being the ground of accusation or the contrary towards those who have neglected or obeyed it.

But, further, every man must have individually the power of using this light, otherwise as we have seen, it would not justly render him personally accountable for acting

or not acting according to its direction. And, indeed, the fact that he has this power is most manifest, because this divine instruction is not addressed to us from without in language that may be differently interpreted; it does not meet the eyes or ears, and so find its way, through the senses and understanding, to the heart and conscience;—no, it lives originally in the conscience itself. It is an impression left on the spirit of man by the divine hand that formed that spirit; it is a *sensus*, a *feeling*, that there is right, or that there is wrong in the things that are proposed to us; and all that is needed is, that we attain to this feeling, and instead of opposing, yield ourselves to its influence. Moreover it is plain that each man individually possesses this power; for the light is not committed to a few for the use of the many; but it is as inseparable from each human being as his own personality. Thus we ourselves perceive how that this knowledge is quite sufficient to make a man responsible, and personally responsible, even as the Scripture taught us to infer. Nay it would seem as if the very consciousness that he possesses this natural information as to right and wrong were the basis of that innate sense of personal responsibility which has been alluded to already at the commencement of this tract.

It must be remarked, by the way, that there are some men in whom the conscience appears to have lost this original power to warn against evil. This "candle of the Lord" seems to be shrouded in thick gloom, and the very light that is in man to have become darkness, so that they are the victims of strong delusion, and believe a lie; with the quietness and confidence of sincere conviction, calling evil good, and good evil. But this apparent inability of the conscience to direct does not take away from the responsibility of such persons, because it has been of their own procuring; they have brought it upon themselves by the continual resistance which they have offered to these inward admonitions. Hence these miserable men can still be justly called to account for not walking in accordance with that truth, the hiding of which from their own souls has been the effect of their own self-indulgence and self-will.

But again the Scripture directs us to another communication of truth which has been bestowed upon man, and to which it alludes as imposing a responsibility upon those who have received it; that is, as justly rendering them accountable for its use or abuse in the direction of their conduct.

This further communication of truth is the Scripture itself. We stop not now to prove its divine origin; this is not part of our question; for we have assumed throughout that we are writing for those who receive the Bible as the Word of God; and its testimony of Him "in whom is no darkness at all." The Scriptures, then, being "given by inspiration of God," are the scriptures of truth, and "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." And the very gift of them, therefore, since they are thus positively declared to be profitable for moral edification in all its parts, implies that they who receive them are responsible for the use of them. But not only so; we have moreover the distinct assertion of this fact in the Word itself. In that solemn description of the judgment contained in Ps. i. we find that the condemnation of the wicked is grounded upon this, that while they declared God's statutes and took His covenant in their mouth, they hated instruction and cast His words behind them. He condemns them, because, having received His word, they had neglected it; for the use of which word, therefore, He holds them responsible. Again our Lord saith to his disciples, "Let that rejecteth me, and receiveth not my words, hath one that judgeth him; the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him in the last day." §

Such passages might easily be multiplied, but these are enough to make certain the inference, which the very gift of this communication naturally suggests, namely, that they who receive it are justly called to account for their use of it. It has not yet, indeed, been given to all men; it is intended for them and ultimately will, we believe, come into their possession; but hitherto circumstances, over which they who are without this word have for the most part had no control, have kept it from them. In such cases of course there can be no responsibility for the use of it. Should, however, the remaining without this gracious communication of truth be willful, the light of conscience assures us that the responsibility attaches; and the man is justly chargeable with the sin of those errors which his voluntary ignorance occasions.

But this point does not practically affect us. Through the kind providence of God we have the Scriptures, and we have them in a language that we can understand; therefore the whole responsibility resulting from the possession of them most justly belongs to us all. And this responsibility let us remember, is personal; we have to answer in person at God's judgment seat, each man for himself, for the degree of rectitude to which we have attained in accordance with the light of Scripture, that other communication of truth we have received from Him.

GLEANINGS FROM FULLER'S CHURCH HISTORY.

CALVIN ON FORMS OF PRAYER.—A. D. 1547.—The dislikers of the Liturgy bare themselves high upon the judgment of Master Calvin, in his letter (four years since) to the

duke of Somerset, Lord Protector, now no longer a master because publicly printed in his Epistles. And yet Master Calvin is therein very positive for a set Form, whose words deserve our translation and observation.

Foranulum precum "I do highly approve a certain Form of Prayer and ecclesiastical rites. A quæ ne pastoribus "From which it should not be lawful for the pastors themselves to discede.

1. Ut consular "That provision be made for some people's ignorance and unskillfulness.

2. Ut certius constet "That the consent of all churches amongst themselves may be more plainly appear.

3. Ut ubique inveniatur "That order may be taken against the desultory levity of such who delight in innovations.

Sic igitur, statum "Thus there ought esse catechismus oportet, statum sacramentorum administrationum, publicam item sacramenta, as also a precum formularum.

So that it seems not a form, but this form of prayer did displease; and exceptions were taken at certain passages still in the Liturgy, though lately reviewed by the bishops and corrected.

CALVIN ON PRAYER FOR THE DEAD.—Mr. Calvin, in his letter to the Lord Protector, disliketh the praying for the dead; and this is one of those things which he termed, tolerabiles infirmitates; Englished by some, "tolerable infirmities;" more mildly by others, "tolerable weaknesses." In requital whereof bishop Williams was wont to say, that Master Calvin had his tolerabiles morositates.

And thus moderately did our first Reformers begin, as the subject they wrote on would give them leave. For as careful mothers and nurses, on condition they can get their children to part with knives, are contented to let them play with rattles, so they permitted ignorant people still to retain some of their fond and foolish customs, that they might remove from them the most dangerous and destructive superstitions.

THE USE OF THE TERM PURITAN.—We must not forget, that Spalato (I am confident I am not mistaken therein) was the first, who, professing himself a Protestant, used the word "Puritan," to signify the defenders of matters doctrinal in the English church. Formerly the word was only taken to denote such as dissented from the hierarchy in discipline and church-government; which now was extended to brand such as were Anti-Arminians in their judgments; As Spalato first abused the word in this sense, so we could wish he had carried it away with him in his return to Rome. Whereas, now leaving the word behind him in this extensive signification thereof, it hath since by others been improved to asperse the most orthodox in doctrine, and religious in conversation.

THE ARCHBISHOP OF SPALATO'S CHARACTER.—He had too much wit and learning to be a cordial papist, and too little honesty and religion to be a sincere protestant.

OUR CHURCHES SUCCEEDED NOT TO THE TEMPLE, BUT SYNAGOGUES. ADORATION TOWARDS THE ALTAR DISLIKED BY MANY.—One controversy was about the holiness of our churches; some maintaining that they succeeded to the same degree of sanctity with the tabernacle of Moses, and temple of Solomon; which others flatly denied. First, Because the tabernacle and temple were, and might be, but one at a time; whilst our churches, without fault, may be multiplied without any set number. Secondly, They both for their fashion, fabric, and utensils, were *jure Divino*, their architects being inspired; whilst our churches are the product of human fancy. Thirdly, God gloriously appeared both in the tabernacle and temple; only graciously present in our churches. Fourthly, The temple was a type of Christ's body; which ours are not. More true it is, our churches are heirs to the holiness of the Jewish synagogues, which were many, and to which a reverence was due as publicly destined to Divine service.

Not less the difference about the manner of adoration to be used in God's house; which some would have done towards the communion-table, as the most remarkable place of God's presence. Those used a distinction between bowing *ad altare*, "towards the altar," as directing their adoration that way, and *ad altare* "to the altar," as terminating their worship therein; the latter they detested as idolatrous, the former they defended as lawful and necessary. Such a slovenly unmanliness had lately possessed many people in their approaches to God's house that it was high time to reform, Mal. i. 7.

But such as disliked the gesture, could not or would not understand the distinction, as in the suburbs of superstition. These allowing some corporal adoration lawful, yet, necessary, seeing no reason [why] the moiety of man, yea, the total sum of him which is visible, his body, should be exempted from God's service, except such a writ of ease could be produced and proved from Scripture. But they were displeas'd with this adoration, because such as enjoin it maintain one kind of reverence due to the very place, another to the elements of the sacraments, if, on the table, a third to God himself: these several degrees of reverence ought to be raised about as well as the communion-table, and clearly dis-

* Gladstone's "Church Principles," p. 422. Rom. xiv. 12.

Gal. vi. 3, 5. Rom. v. 13. Rom. ii. 14, 15.

Prov. xx. 27. 2 Tim. iii. 16. 2 Thess. ii. 10, 12. John xii. 48.