the earlier and better days of American law: the judiciary elected by popular vote and for limited terms has ennobled our history with no names which posterity will not willingly let die, and has disgraced us with such proceedings as these just recorded."

Nor are the evils of the system only discernible in the New York Courts. Wherever it prevails the result is the same. In the State of Pennsylvania a different phase lately presented itself. A judge was bespattered with abuse by the leading papers opposed to his supposed political views, for the simple and only reason that he was supposed to be the candidate to some official position, which in fact he was not, without his detractors even taking the trouble apparently to ascertain if their supposition were correct.

We have not an elective judiciary, and may be glad of the fact—let it be the aim of those in authority to do *their* duty in appointing those who will, both personally and professionally, command the respect their position is entitled to, and then in the Courts of inferior as well as superior jurisdiction, there will be no fear that that respect will be wanting, or that the legacy happily left to us of an unstained and competent judiciary will be wanting.

CHAMBER APPLICATIONS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY.

Among the bills introduced during the present session of the Legislature we notice one by Mr. Blake "to provide for the more satisfactory disposal of Chambers Applications in the Court of Chancery." It consists of four clauses and proposes to enact shortly that hereafter "the Judges Secretary shall have power to hear and dispose of all *ex parte* Chambers applications and of all other Chambers applications on which only one party appears, or which the parties consent to take before him;" that "every order made by the Judge's Secretary under the preceding clause shall have the same force and shall be subject to the like appeal as if made by a Judge in Chambers;" and that "the Judges of the Court or any two of them of whom the Chancellor shall be one, may make such orders as they shall deem expedient to effectuate the provisions of this Act, and may from time to time vary, add to, or repeal such orders."

The benefit of this enactment, or of one giving even more extended powers to the Judges' Secretary is unquestionable. At present the Secretary's power as a Chamber Judge is limited to hearing any applications which the parties may choose to bring before him, and then submitting the same with his opinion thereon to a Judge for his order; the order made being subject to be set aside or varied on an appeal in the first instance to a single Judge. The disadvantages of this mode of procedure consist in the almost inevitable delay caused by the Secretary conferring with a Judge upon the subject matter of the motion before an order can be made, and even if a Judge is at hand, which is not always the case, it is very unlikely that he can at once give his attention to business probably of less importance than that which he may then be engaged in. But it frequently happens that all the Judges are absent from town at the same time, and although such periods of absence are of limited duration, yet during that time Chamber business, so far as the disposal of any motion of other than minor importance is concerned, is practically at a stand still, and the advantage of having an officer such as the Judge's Secretary is to a certain extent neutralised.

In the next place, an appeal from an order made on a hearing before the Secretary must be made to a single Judge. It has been the usual practice—and undoubtedly the right practice—to bring on the appeal to be heard before the Judge with whom the Secretary conferred, otherwise we should have one Judge reviewing the decision of another. But if the Judge with whom the Secretary has to confer be absent, the appeal must lie vero until his return. Let us suppose however that the appeal has been heard and decided; the unsuccessful party if dissatisfied has still a right to rehear the order before three Judges and thus in the end he arrives, by a more circuitous and expensive route, at the same point which he would have gained more easily if the motion had been heard in the first instance by one of the Judges, or by some one possessing like powers. Mr. Blake's Act proposes to remedy these defects in the present system by conferring the Secretary the same power with respect to the applications specified as a Judge would have. We are not aware whether any alterations have been made in the bill as introduced, but it would have been advisable to have made some provision to prevent parties from taking advantage of the privilege given to