

and delivery vehicles. We are, therefore, of the opinion that nuclear-weapons signatories to a treaty should be party to a clear and compelling declaration of intent to embark on the process of nuclear-arms control. In short, we think that by means of this treaty nuclear as well as non-nuclear states should contribute, and be seen to contribute, to the objective of nuclear disarmament.

It is, of course, important in this connection to ensure that the treaty should be seen to work effectively in practice. A provision for periodic review of its terms and operation is, therefore, an objective to which the Canadian Government has already subscribed and will continue to pursue.

The term "loophole" has been freely used in this Committee's deliberations on a non-proliferation treaty. In our view, a treaty permitting non-nuclear-weapons states to conduct, on a national basis, nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, would contain a substantial loophole. We believe that it is impossible to distinguish between the technology required in nuclear explosions for peaceful as against military purposes and that a non-nuclear-weapons power which detonated a nuclear explosive device, no matter for what purposes would - in effect - have taken a decisive step towards the production of nuclear weapons. At the same time, we believe that a treaty should contain a clear assurance that non-nuclear-weapon powers may obtain the economic and scientific benefits of the use of peaceful nuclear explosions and, specifically, should have assurances of obtaining from nuclear-weapons powers the use of such explosive devices under the supervision of an appropriate international organization. We are pleased to note that President Johnson has said in his message that the U.S.A. is prepared to make nuclear-explosive services for peaceful purposes available to non-nuclear-weapons states on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international safeguards.

There has been some discussion recently of the value of technological "spin-off" from nuclear explosions. We are not convinced that such "spin-off" is significant, but we note again that President Johnson has assured us that not only peaceful explosive services but also any technological "spin-off" from them will be available to non-nuclear-weapons states. It goes without saying, of course, that a treaty should not place any inhibitions whatever on research or development of advanced peaceful nuclear technology.

It is, in our view, important that a non-proliferation treaty should include an effective safeguards clause, the main purpose of which would be to ensure that the treaty provisions are being observed and that nuclear fuel designated for peaceful purposes is not diverted clandestinely to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it will be important to establish the principle that the treaty safeguards system, to be internationally administered, must be acceptable to the great majority of states which are expected to sign the treaty.

I have touched in a very general way on some of the most important issues that we will be examining in the weeks ahead. We propose to present our views in a more comprehensive manner once we have a draft treaty text before us