

"south-western frontier, and would in great measure depend for its defence on a land force, but this land force would run a risk of being isolated and cut off, unless its left flank were protected, and communication maintained with the Province of Quebec, and through that province with the sea. Therefore, *coute qui coute*, the command of Lake Ontario must be secured and maintained. Here Canada is at an advantage, the best harbours being situated on her shores, and the greater number of the steamers trading on the lake being held or manned by Canadians. These harbours, such as Coburg, Port Hope, Toronto, Hamilton, Niagara, and Welland Canal, would require the protection either of permanent or extemporised fortifications."

Kingston.

Kingston should be rendered as secure as possible from capture, and contain a strong garrison capable of protecting the mouth of the Rideau Canal and supporting detachments guarding the Grand Trunk Railway at Brockville and Prescott to Montreal, thus protecting Ottawa, the capital, and the communications to the east.

It is to be hoped that we shall on the Lakes also so far take the initiative recommended by Mr. Brassey, M.P., by encouraging a volunteer naval reserve on Lake Ontario. The common trading steamers and vessels, if armed with an ordinary rifled field gun, would require no extra strengthening, and from the power and range of such guns, would be a powerful means of retaining command of this lake, as well as of the water communications between Kingston and Montreal, and the canals which avoid the several rapids of the St. Lawrence and the Rideau Canal. Troops would be concentrated at the junctions of railroads and communications from the west, such as Sarnia, Stratford, London, Guelph.

An attack from the west, however, though it might be a good political move, would be bad military strategy, as tending only to roll up the defence along the lines of communication towards the point of support and base of supply, instead of cutting it in two by an attack on the centre.

An Enemy's Central Base—Lines of Operation and Objective.

The enemy's principal base of operations would probably be at Albany, the central point from which natural lines of operation lead direct to Montreal, north-east to Quebec, and westerly to Niagara or Sackets harbour, if Kingston were a secondary objective.

Albany is moreover an arsenal to which there is access by river, road and railway from all quarters, including the Pennsylvania coal and iron country.

Springfield, a small-arm factory, and Troy also a manufacturing town, both communicating with Albany and New York, would be subsidiary bases for supplies, which could be poured along the Hudson river and Canal, Lake Champlain, and the roads and railroads all converging on the objective point, Montreal. The strongly fortified posi-