

there is no appearance, that *our Ministers* had any reason to apprehend *before* Mr. *Holbourn* sailed from Spithead, that Mr. *la Motte* would be “ordered to Louisbourg:” but, as soon as they had, they sent Mr. *Holbourn* a reinforcement, which made him still superior to the *whole* French fleet.

And with regard to the observation, “That the naval force sent to take Louisbourg was dispatched too late in the year;” it is well known that Mr. *Holbourn* lay wind-bound at Spithead, St. Helen’s, and Cork, six weeks in the whole at least, and was afterwards nine weeks on his passage to Halifax: if his ships had not been thus retarded, he must have arrived there by the beginning of May; in which case he would have had it in his power (according to the Letter-writer’s own account of the times of the arrival of the French ships at Louisbourg) first to have intercepted Mr. *Revest’s* and Mr. *Beaufremon’s* squadrons separately, (but if not separately, his squadron was superior to their *joint* force) or at least to have prevented their entering the harbour; and Mr. *la Motte*, who did not get to Louisbourg till the 29th of June, would, in all probability, have shared the same fate; which must have secured the reduction of Louisbourg. That Mr. *Holbourn* did not happen to arrive at Halifax by that time, according to the intention of the *Ministers*, and what might have reasonably been expected, can’t be justly charged to *their* account, but was wholly owing to contrary winds; an adverse Event, which all sea Enterprises are liable to, and no *Ministers* can either foresee or controul.

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