

ensure that all states carry out that particular disarmament measure. In other words, let us take a measure of disarmament and with it study the verification needed for that measure, rather than studying verification in general.

Let us take an example from the Soviet draft treaty to illustrate my point. Article 5 provides for the elimination of certain means of delivering nuclear weapons and for the cessation of the production. Paragraph 3 of this article provides that the implementation of these measures should be verified by inspectors of the international disarmament organization. The language of the Soviet draft treaty suggests that substantial inspection would be allowed over this measure of disarmament. What we need to clarify is how much the inspectors are to be allowed to see, and the conditions under which they would carry out this work. Having done that, the committee would then be able to judge how adequate the inspection arrangements would be for verifying the execution of this particular measure.

In pursuing an examination of the problem of inspection, particularly in the area of disarmament which I have just mentioned, the application of sampling techniques as suggested by the United States representative should facilitate agreement. This approach ought to go a long way toward removing fears that inspection will be out of balance with disarmament or be used for any illegitimate purpose. We sincerely believe there is great hope of reaching an agreement on the question of verification through some type of sampling procedure.

The same method of careful, painstaking examination, rather than abstract debate, should be applied in other areas where important but ill defined differences appear to exist between the two sides.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I should like to make some proposals concerning procedure. Ever since the breakdown of the ten nation committee nearly two years ago, Canada has been convinced that rapid progress in disarmament negotiations would require a more efficient procedure than has been adopted in the past. In particular, we believe that agreement on effective procedural arrangements is a matter of the first importance if a committee of this size, with 17 or 18 nations participating, is to operate effectively.

The immediate question is how to proceed from the present exchange of general views on disarmament to a detailed examination of the specific problems. In the opinion of my delegation, an effective working procedure would be as follows. First, an informal committee of the whole conference should be

established on a continuing basis, with the number attending from each delegation being more limited than at plenary meetings. Second, the co-chairmen should be given the responsibility for presiding over this committee on alternate days. They should maintain close consultation with one another on the order of business. I think the plan we are following in plenary meetings of having rotating chairmen is very good,—although I know from personal experience that it is more or less an honorary position and puts one in the category of being king for a day. But we believe that for the informal committee it would be much wiser to have the co-chairmen in the chair on alternate days. Third, the emphasis in the committee should be on an informal and private method of work. There need be no list of speakers and no verbatim records should be kept. A summary record could be provided for the information of delegations.

The main purpose of this informal working committee would be threefold: first, to follow up as a matter of priority the common elements in the two plans, such as the seven points which I mentioned earlier; second, to try to achieve reasonable compromises in remaining areas where clear differences between the two sides persist; and third, to make more precise the points under dispute in areas where differences between the two sides are yet ill defined.

In suggesting this procedure, my delegation has had in mind the experience of the conference here in Geneva on the future of Laos. Although there are continuing difficulties in the field in the unhappy country, the work of the conference here in Geneva has been successful. This has been due in large measure to the fact that an effective procedure was adopted, a procedure similar to the one I am now suggesting for the disarmament conference. At our meeting on Friday, the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, also referred to the experience of the Laos conference—of course, India, like Canada, is participating in that conference—and he asked in this context that the committee meet informally so that the representatives of the United States and the Soviet union might provide clarification of respective ideas. We support this idea and agree with this proposal, but what we have in mind in addition is to use the proposed informal committee not only for the purpose of seeking information, but more importantly as a continuing forum for negotiation. By inviting the guidance of the co-chairmen we recognize that the United States and the Soviet union have by far the greatest responsibility in the field of disarmament. I do not suppose that either one of these