

*Supply—National Defence*

missiles will be travelling at several thousand miles an hour. The whole question of locating, tracking, intercepting and destroying the missile must be accomplished within the time of flight of the missile which may be as short as 15 or 20 minutes. The United States have given this project first priority and are putting a great deal of effort and money into a program of defence against missile attack, but it appears unlikely that a satisfactory means of intercepting and destroying the missile will be accomplished within the next few years. In consequence, there may be a period between the time when the ICBM is available to a potential enemy and the time when some defence against the ballistic missile is possible.

At present there is no defence against the missile after it has left its launching pad, and several years may elapse before such a defence is operationally practical. Therefore this gap in our joint defence must be considered most carefully in our defence planning and in the steps we are taking to ensure our survival if unfortunately we are forced into war during this interval.

In view of the consequences of nuclear war the world is perhaps approaching the stage when the use of force as an instrument of policy to settle man's differences is no longer valid. It is hoped that some means other than armed conflict will eventually be found to settle international disputes. To this end we have demonstrated our willingness to lend assistance in order to help reduce tension in potentially explosive areas, thereby preventing the exploitation of force as an instrument of policy. Our troops assigned to the United Nations emergency force and to other peace preserving teams are continuing examples of our interest in this direction.

Until general agreement on disarmament is reached, however, we must support the maintenance of an adequate deterrent to war to make it quite apparent to any would-be aggressor that he cannot use force as an instrument of policy without running the risk of devastating retaliation. It is necessary, therefore, for us to maintain our forces both here and abroad as part of the deterrent of the west. It is our fervent hope that these two primary elements of defence policy will succeed and that war will be averted. However, there is an element of miscalculation and misunderstanding that cannot as yet be removed from international relations; therefore it is prudent that these deterrent forces should be so designed that they will be of use to blunt any attack and to assist in survival.

With these observations in mind I would now refer to Canada's defence policy. This

policy was set forth in the paper on defence tabled at the end of April. This paper is intended to assist hon. members during these discussions. Anyone who has read it should have a better understanding of our policy and the state of our forces. The paper is not intended to be the instrument through which major new policy is announced. During the year changes in policy and the procurement of new equipment have been communicated to the house as decisions have been reached. The effects of these decisions are reflected in the estimates now before the committee, and are detailed in the report.

The committee will be aware of some of these important decisions, all of which have been announced or referred to in the house during the past year: for example, the cancellation of the Arrow program, adoption of the Bomarc missile and related semi-automatic ground environment; the acquisition of a surface to surface missile for the Canadian army; negotiations for the procurement of nuclear weapons announced by the Prime Minister on February 20 of this year; construction of six additional destroyer escorts; plans for a tanker supply ship to increase the range of the destroyer escorts and thus enable these ships to stay at sea for longer periods of time, and the granting of facilities at four Canadian air fields for SAC refueling aircraft; the tasks assigned to the Canadian army in respect of survival operations and civil defence. Had a policy of withholding this information been followed and the first announcement given in the white paper it would indeed have been a sensational document.

The format of the report is not intended to copy what is known as a British white paper, although the latter does not always announce new policy. It will be recalled that in 1957 a so-called five-year plan was announced by the British government with regard to defence. The details of this plan were, in general, already well known in that country prior to the publication of the white paper. The British report on defence in 1958, however, had the following introductory remark:

This paper reports the progress made in implementing that policy.

That is, the policy which had been announced a year before. Recently another British white paper announced the details of some major changes and reorganization of the British army. No such changes have taken place here because they are not applicable to our organization.

In the report that I made available in April—and it is the type of report that requires some time to prepare—I endeavoured to set forth our defence policy, to outline how that