

External Affairs

and how would he like it to take form? It is hinted at again at page 462 of *Hansard* where he is reported as saying:

The territorial ambitions of the Soviet empire . . . are not limited except by recognition of the fact that there may be some point beyond which they dare not go.

But again he left questions in my mind. What is the point at which the Soviet union will stop? Does the leader of the opposition know that point; or does Mr. Stalin, for that matter, know it? I do not know, and I think the leader of the Conservative party ought to give his opinion as to where that point is. Is it in Viet Nam? Is it in Malaya? Is it in Thailand or is it even as far as India?

Then as reported at page 463 he talks again of firm action and he says:

When I say "firm action" I mean the kind of united action to preserve peace which the Russians will recognize today just as the Germans would have recognized it either in 1914 or in 1939.

But again he has left too many "i's" undotted and too many "t's" uncrossed. It seems to me as though he desires to impose his terms upon the Russians, and I do not think there is any nation in the world today which can impose terms of any kind on that country. As reported at page 465 of *Hansard*, for instance, he tells us this:

Appeasement is going to go no further; we have learned the lessons of the past and there will be no truck and trade with tyranny of this kind unless and until they are at least prepared to accept the ordinary standards of international conduct.

Again the hon. gentleman seems to wish to impose upon the Russians his desire and his conception of the ordinary standards of international conduct. I am afraid that his standards and mine differ, because only too frequently the standards of international conduct which we have seen in operation are the standards of the jungle. He asks for peace, yes. He tells us that his speech is geared to peace. But again I suggest that the peace which he envisages is peace on our terms; and the Russians I think have already made it amply clear that they are not prepared to accept those terms.

He stated that there should be no recognition of Mao until common action is decided upon. The view has already been expressed, I think, that common action now is impossible in view of the fact that certain members of the commonwealth and of the Pacific area have already recognized Mao while others, including the United States, have not. I suggest further that common action is impossible in a world of national sovereign states, where what will most appeal to a state is its national interests. The British have recognized Mao not because they like him but because they thought it was essential for trading relationships that they should do so. The Americans

have not recognized him for their own good reasons, not the least of which is the matter of prestige.

How then can we reconcile these two national views? The leader of the official opposition (Mr. Drew) also asked members of the house to express their views on the matter of recognition. He stated that the Mao regime was imposed by force. I am not prepared to dispute that, but nevertheless it is very obvious that it was a force which was acceptable to the great mass of the Chinese people. It was a force which was acceptable to the peasants and the workers in the cities, and also to the intellectuals of China. Obviously the Kuomintang regime had little hold on the loyalty or affections of the Chinese people. One has only to consider the defections of the Chinese armies, and the constant surrender after surrender of Chinese cities to realize that Chiang had little hope of holding either these towns or the loyalty of the people. The reason he had little hope was that the communists offered the people of China food. A bowl of rice today in China is an infinitely greater argument than all of the ideologies which the wit of man has devised. We have to learn again the lesson that the strongest argument against communism in Asia today is food. And now we see Formosa groaning under the bureaucracy of nationalist refugees, and also under threat from the Peking government. I think there is little doubt but that island will eventually fall.

There are certain arguments for recognition. I have already advanced one of them, the national interests of our country. I am not prepared to say exactly when and at what time China should be recognized, but there is another aspect of the situation which must be considered and that is that the recognition of China undoubtedly is a weapon in the strategy of the cold war which is being waged all across the globe. Non-recognition by the western powers may mean a surrender by default to Moscow of leadership which we ought to be giving Asia. That is one of the dangers which we face.

We know that Mao signed an agreement with the authorities at the Kremlin. On the face of it, it appears to be not unfavourable to the Peking government. They are going to get the help of certain technicians from Russia. They are going to be given back certain cities in Manchuria, and we shall have to wait until 1952 to see if that promise materializes. They are getting a loan of some \$300 million spread over five or six years which, so far as the rehabilitation of China is concerned, is nothing but a drop in the bucket. Nevertheless one can adduce that as evidence to show that there is close integration between