

simply one of promise. Their fleet will not be completed, and they do not profess that it can be completed short of five years unless they buy their ships from England. The policy of the opposition is an imperial navy under the one flag, united and strong, under which Canada will have ample protection. The place where the farmers of Canada require to be protected is the North sea, because there is the danger point, although in some future day the centre may be changed and the danger point may be in the Mediteranean. Canada is not in any danger on the Pacific slope or the Atlantic sea-board, but in the North sea. Germany at the furthest is but two days sail from the British shores, and if she succeeds in taking Holland, she will be within only a few hours sail of the British coast, so that Britain has to be ever on the alert, not knowing when the German fleet may advance on her coasts and attack her navy. The policy of the opposition is one imperial navy, ready to be concentrated at a moment's notice at any given point. But the policy of the government is to have a Canadian navy acting independently and restricted to our own coasts, and which consequently could not give any effective assistance in an emergency. The policy of the opposition is to provide an effective navy and at the same time do so as economically as possible. Not that we object to proper expenditure, but we desire that every dollar should be expended where it can have the most effect; and when the time comes for a reference to the people, and the people will draw a contrast between the government policy of a Canadian navy, not acting automatically in concert with the imperial navy, and which will only go out to service when the Prime Minister of Canada gives the order, and the policy of the opposition which will provide a navy ready to take service at all times, I have no doubt as to what the verdict will be. Under our policy, while we would provide at once an effective navy, the cost to the country would be only \$800,000 a year, whereas, under the government policy, which would only provide a navy in some five years, the cost will be infinitely greater—upwards of four and a half million dollars per year. Then the navy outlined by the government cannot guarantee protection to our trade and commerce on the sea because it would not be concentrated with but would act separately from the British navy. On the other hand the policy proposed by the leader of the opposition does guarantee protection to our trade and commerce; and all that we would spend on this line would be well spent, even though we had to pay the same every year for all time to come. In fact, as an insurance on our trade and commerce, it would be a very small contribution indeed. The policy of the opposition would tend to

promote peace by letting Germany see that, not only the motherland, but the colonies of the empire are prepared to do their duty. On the other hand, the policy of the government has the tendency to create uncertainty and to disunite and disintegrate the nation.

The policy of the leader of the opposition is automatic—when Britain is at war Canada is at war, and our ships, trained in the imperial navy, are ready for action. Let me point out as an answer to those who criticise this aspect of the case that long before the Franco-Prussian war, an arrangement was come to by the independent kingdoms of Bavaria and Wurtemberg and the Grand Duchy of Baden with Prussia, that the moment the commander in chief of the German army issued the order, the troops of these three nations would automatically, be at the unrestricted disposal of Prussia. If then, for the purpose of the German empire, Prussia could make such an arrangement with Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden—three absolutely independent nations—so that their troops would be at the order of the King of Prussia, and automatically take the field under his command, the moment war broke out, why should not such an arrangement be arrived at between Britain and her colonies. Much greater is the necessity that the troops and the navies of the colonies should, when the emergency arose, be at the command of the parent government. When the parent government felt the emergency coming, no doubt we would all be consulted, but when the emergency arose our navy would automatically fall under the command of the imperial authorities, and we would have combined training as well as united strength. The position of the government reminds me of the captain of a company of Fenians down near Huntingdon border at the time of the Fenian raid of 1870. He lined his men up against the border and he said: Now boys, before you is Canada and behind you is the United States, I want to ask you one question: Will you fight or run? The answer came promptly, we will. Again, he said, I repeat the question, will you fight or will you run? Again came the answer, we will. And the captain said: I knew you would. And just the some farmers along the border who had heard the fellows were coming over, let into them and they soon knew which they would do. In like manner this policy of a Canadian navy, hedged up and kept at the disposal of the government of Canada until the Prime Minister gives his sanction to its going to the support of the motherland, possibly untrained and unequipped, with a lot of officers better posted in balls and dances, which take up most of their time while dallying around our harbours, will be about as effective as this Fenian corps who