

one of his favourite heroes, with a slight amendment :

Though old he was a Tartar,
And not at all disposed to prove a martyr.

Furthermore, Sir, you and I know that in all well-regulated families of any standing, whether they be private or political, there are reasons for not hastily deposing persons of experience like the hon. baronet. In all these families there are cupboards, and in all these cupboards there are skeletons. Now, Sir, let us suppose for one moment that the hon. baronet should take to telling the House and the country all he knows of his hon. colleagues. And just fancy—suppose his colleagues were to take to telling the House and the country all they know of the hon. baronet. As to the hon. leader of the Opposition, I trust he will not misunderstand me, that he will not think I am aiming to proselytize him when I say that, in my opinion, from the time that he returned to Canada to this moment, he has shown most unmistakable clear grit. Nevertheless, his valour ought to be tempered with a little more discretion. I would suggest to him that there is no use of running amuck against exalted personages, as he did the other night. I am not prepared to say that he is not justified by tradition and precedent. As well as I can recollect, it has been the old and time-honoured Conservative belief that you may always rotten-egg a Governor General if he does not happen to agree with you. Some members of the party have even emphasized this view by burning Parliament buildings and by publishing annexation manifestoes in order to express their extreme distaste at the conduct of the representative of Her Majesty. At the same time, I can believe that the hon. gentleman is not quite so rancorous as he appears. If I am not altogether mistaken in recalling a certain interesting occasion, not so very long ago, in this city, among the many costly tributes which were tendered to the hon. gentleman, not the least costly, not the least elegant, was one presented by the exalted personage referred to. Therefore, I infer that the hon. gentleman is not so implacable as he seems. He may have thought it well to imitate the children of Isreal, who revenged themselves on their enemies by accepting from them jewels of silver and jewels of gold before they went out into the wilderness to look for more.

Now, I desire to state—and I am sure that I speak the opinion of hon. gentlemen beside me—we do not for one moment deprecate any fair or proper criticism of our proceedings; that is the business of the Opposition. We did it according to the best of our abilities when we sat on that side of the House, and we certainly cannot object if they do the same. But criticism, in order to be effective, must have some sound foundation. I notice the criticism made

by the hon. gentleman (Mr. Foster), and concurred in by the leader of the Opposition, a criticism of a very remarkable kind, to which I wish to call the special attention of their friends and ours. Sir, these hon. gentlemen declare that they have proof positive in the public returns of the utter failure of our policy to encourage trade with England. And what does the House suppose is the proof they give? Sir, it was said by the hon. baronet, and endorsed by his friend beside him, that the proof of the utter failure of our policy is to be found in the fact that in the fiscal year ending 30th June, 1897, the imports from England amounted to \$29,412,000, being a reduction of \$3,000,000 odd, and that hence our policy had failed. Well, Sir, surely these hon. gentlemen do not wish to conceal from the House that our policy came into effect only at the end of the tenth month of the year—on the 23rd of April, 1897, my hon. friend (Mr. Fielding) brought down his Budget. Up to that time the whole of the trade was carried on under the tariff framed by these hon. gentlemen. Now, no human being supposed or expected for one moment that within two months we could change the operations of eighteen years. Sir, I take these figures, and from these identical figures I deduce the strongest possible condemnation of the policy of these hon. gentlemen. In the twenty-five years from 1873 to 1897, our imports from Great Britain fell from \$68,000,000 to \$29,412,000. Sir, that was the result of their policy. That loss that the hon. gentleman speaks of, including that deficit of \$3,000,000 odd, is due directly, clearly and unmistakably to the policy of these hon. gentlemen themselves. This was five-sixths more their year than it was ours, even allowing—which I cannot for a moment allow—that we should have been able within two months to materially affect the ordinary course of trade. So it is plain and clear to a demonstration—the logic is inevitable, as the hon. gentleman said—that the exact result of their policy was to double our trade with the United States, as far as imports were concerned, and to reduce more than one-half the trade from England. Now, Sir, I will tell hon. gentlemen opposite, that if they want to criticise our policy, they must wait a little. In the first place, the effect of our tariff does not fairly begin until the first of August next, when the 25 per cent reduction takes effect. If on the first of July next the tariff returns show the same results relatively that they do to-day, still more, if on the first of August, 1899, the tariff returns show that our trade with England has diminished and trade with the United States has increased, then we may say, and say with some truth, that our well-intentioned and liberal exertions to aid English trade have not had the success we expected.

But to say on the evidence adduced by those hon. gentlemen, on the evidence of our