

CONCLUSIONS

It is not my thought in a paper of this kind to attempt to present you with definitive conclusions on matters so complex and so important. I think it must be clear, however, that both the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments in the field of disarmament has not led to the final results which all of us had hoped would be possible when the United Nations was first established. Nevertheless those of us who have participated in the work of these two commissions feel that such useful preparatory work has been done. In the Atomic Energy Commission I feel that the pattern which any effective agreement must take has been evolved and set forth in the majority reports. I think I can speak for my colleagues in this majority when I say that not only do our proposals represent the elements of a proper solution to this grave problem but that we believe that they represent the only solution. In the Commission for Conventional Armaments I believe we have taken a most important first step in providing a plan for a survey which, if accepted and carried out, would give the world the information requisite to a useful discussion of this complex subject.

The continuing disagreement between the Communist and non-Communist world which has affected the work of the United Nations as a whole has unquestionably been the principal reason why it has not been possible to reach agreement on disarmament and the Western Powers, in insisting upon the principle that disarmament must follow and not precede the establishment of an effective system of security, have had in mind the costly experience of unilateral disarmament by peace-loving states in the years preceding World War II.

I think it is safe to conclude that the Western Powers will not agree to accept any system for the prohibition of atomic weapons or the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces which does not give assurance of adequate security for all nations. It seems equally clear that the Soviet Union for their part are unwilling at this stage to accept the kind of international control and international inspection which is so obviously necessary for an effective system of control. In particular, the Soviet Union and those countries which think like her are unprepared to open up their frontiers to international inspection on a continuing basis - they insist on national management ownership and control over atomic energy and likewise in the matter of conventional armaments they will not agree to disclose their forces and armaments or to allow adequate verification thereof. It is difficult to see, therefore, how it will be possible to reach agreement on these matters until such time as there has been some agreement in the realm of policy which will permit all nations to join in the kind of international cooperative effort which is the only possible way to assure to all nations the kind of security on a universal basis which is envisaged under the United Nations Charter.

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