

recommend continuing to conduct war games and crisis simulations involving U.S. and Chinese offensive counterspace warfare, developing temporary and reversible means to negate others' space capabilities, and perpetuating U.S. superiority both in military space capabilities and in terrestrial capabilities to fight even without reliance on space assets.

While deterrence may have been the most viable organizing principle for Cold War security, given the intense ideological rivalry between the superpowers and the extraordinary destructive power of nuclear weapons, neither is a basic feature of current space security policy. Today, the main space-faring states have far more common interests than they have conflicting ones. Each has the means to interfere with others' use of space, but few interference scenarios would benefit a state more than it would harm it. The fact that multiple states could use a military or space capability designed for another purpose as an ASAT if their own satellites were attacked probably has a residual deterrent effect, but this is not the main reason states have consistently refrained from attacking each other's satellites. If states were to make such deterrence relationships the dominant principle guiding military and diplomatic efforts to enhance space security, they would promote and institutionalize an unnecessarily adversarial and military-dominated approach to space security.

From a strategic standpoint, the fundamental problem of security in space has remained constant—i.e., how to provide enough reassurance that others tolerate and maybe even facilitate your space activities. The context for this question, though, has shifted from one where two roughly equal adversaries were locked in a deterrence relationship to a much more asymmetrical and highly interdependent world. Long after the end of the Cold War, the United States maintains military superiority in space and on Earth, but its greater dependence on space means that there is also relatively greater U.S. vulnerability to deliberate or inadvertent interference. As information technology becomes more central to the global economy, many countries see it as strategically important to have their own basic space capabilities for development, economic growth, political influence, and military modernization. Yet, the global spread of space capabilities also distributes the rudimentary means to interfere with others' space assets.<sup>38</sup> Because it is technically and economically impractical to protect unilaterally all the governmental and commercial satellites on which it depends, the United States needs reliable reassurance that other countries will neither use their space-related capabilities to attack its satellites nor engage in irresponsible space behavior that puts these satellites at risk. The rest of the space-faring world also seeks reliable reassurance that the United States will be a "responsible" space power: that it will abide by the same rules as everybody else does, that it will respect other countries' rights to use space freely in the same ways it does, and that it will not exploit space for unfair military or commercial advantages. Furthermore, they want reassurance that they can have a place at the table when key decisions affecting their use of space are made.

Such a reassurance-based, cooperative security regime for space would differ from traditional arms controls in several important respects. Contrary to traditional arms controls, which sought to stabilize deterrence by minimizing an adversary's incentives to initiate or escalate a nuclear war and maximizing incentives for restraint, a reassurance-based space security regime would try to maximize everybody's ability to use space for peaceful purposes while minimizing deliberate or inadvertent interference.

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<sup>38</sup> Joan Johnson-Freese, *Space as a Strategic Asset* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 9-10.