

democratization in Pakistan would ever work, as the military has often had a preponderant role in relations with India, even during periods of democracy in Pakistan.

Common external threats that could unite India and Pakistan together to combat it, and as such ending the rivalry, do not exist.

Future internal or external political shocks, such as rapid shifts in alliance structures, civil war in either Pakistan or India, or the arrival of revisionist or visionary leaders on both sides of the conflict could lead to the termination of the conflict. But these are not really predictable, and as such do not serve as strong bases for expecting rivalry termination.

"India-Pakistan Conflict in the Light of General Theories of War, Rivalry and Deterrence," presented by John Vasquez (Colgate University), asked whether the India Pakistan rivalry fits into theories of war as developed by empirical research. Issues such as territoriality and the value placed by decision makers on realist theory and international relations make the conflict one that fits well with general theories of war. Nuclear weapons, and the assumption of deterrence theory that a broader war will not occur if both sides have them, does not seem to fit in this case. The presence of territorial disputes, a lack of tolerance for the status quo, a lack of experience with great wars, a lack of distinct rules of the game, a lack of crisis management techniques, and little arms control makes nuclear weapons a dangerous variable in this conflict, and as such we cannot rely on deterrence theory to assure against nuclear conflict in the region. He concluded by stating that the India-Pakistan conflict is not atypical in its persistence, caused mostly by a high degree of irredentism and territorial asymmetry, plus the role of incompatible identities (where Kashmir is linked closely to both India's and Pakistan's national identity).

In the discussion period that followed the presentations, questions arose regarding the role of territoriality in the conflict, the development of the conflict pre-1947, deterrence theory and the India-China conflict, the separation of identity conflict and territorial conflict, the role of conflict points outside Kashmir (ie. The Punjab and Afghanistan), the notion of territoriality and falsifiability. Specifically, Michael Brecher (McGill University) argued that Kashmir is much more than simply a territorial conflict, where issues of state formation in Pakistan and state legitimization in India rely on this territory.

In the second session, Russell Leng (Middlebury College) discussed the role of learning in his paper "Realpolitik and Learning in the India-Pakistan Rivalry." He began by questioning why India and Pakistan find themselves in a never-ending series of crises and wars. He argued that a combination of factors, involving changes in the regional and international environment, the role of learning, and psychological factors all play a role in making the conflict an enduring one. Leng's presentation focused on the role of learning, arguing that India's learning process has shown that Pakistan is not a trustworthy adversary, and that realism works vis-à-vis Islamabad. Pakistan, on the otherhand, has learned that it cannot get Kashmir through direct armed invasion. Rather, it has learned that through creating instability and getting external parties involved in Kashmir that it can have an effect, although not the one it perceives. Both states have also misinterpreted