

better organized to meet the needs of the aforementioned scenarios.

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent multi-lateral involvement of United Nations (UN) and non-UN actors in the peacekeeping, peace support and peace enforcement environments compelled western military establishments to formalize the ad-hoc nature of the support given during these types of operations. This support became known as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), or as it is referred to by the British, Australian and New Zealand military establishments, Civil Military Affairs (CMA). CIMIC had by the late 1990s evolved into a doctrine advocated by most Western militaries. As the British Department of Defence noted, the end of the Cold War brought about a renaissance in the world of CIMIC, "[and] it became a central feature of British Peace Support Operations...",² as is has in most other Western militaries. By the late 1990s the Canadian Forces (CF) had developed its own CIMIC doctrine *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*.

OBJECTIVE

CIMIC offers the government of Canada a mechanism to further its foreign policy objectives vis-a-vis the Human Security Agenda. By default, it also offers the Department of National Defence (DND) a clear policy mandate for the CF. For CIMIC to function as an effective policy tool for both the military and the government, three paradigms— that of the military, Government agencies, and non-Governmental actors— must be addressed and co-ordinated to make CIMIC function as outlined in this paper.

While there will be a review of each paradigm, the emphasis will be on the military as CIMIC is clearly a military doctrine, and by this fact CIMIC is operationally the bailiwick of the military. It is hoped that by showing the existing flaws inherent in the present CIMIC ideal, solutions can be offered to enhance CIMIC, specifically as a powerful policy tool that can be used