



“customized” to fit precisely the situation on the ground, for which specific tactical tasks will be executed. In military terms, which are fully appropriate to the report’s examination of peacekeeping and peace operations, the campaign plan is developed at the operational level for a specific “theatre of operations.” This plan may comprise a number of different “sub-operations” or sub-plans for specific locales or for differing periods of time. These operations and sub-operations are coordinated at the operational level by what, in UN terms, is the Head of Mission, either the Special Representative of the Secretary General or the Force Commander.

All of the financial, material and personnel resources identified by the UN in any operation are ultimately applied to pursue specific activities on the ground, at what this report calls the **tactical level**. Each tactical element in any operation has one or two discrete tasks. For example, one element of a peace operation might be responsible for monitoring a ceasefire. Another could be responsible for the collection and storage of weapons. A third could be assigned the responsibility for receiving, delivering and distributing humanitarian aid. A fourth element might be designated to help in the preparation of an electoral process. It is evident that nothing will be accomplished if these tactical activities function inadequately or fail to reflect the idea of “unity of effort”.

Our use of these four levels as an analytical device has two broad purposes. The first is to make absolutely clear our conviction that a rapid-reaction capability can only be successfully implemented through broad and systematic changes in many parts of the UN system, including among states and within the Security Council, as well as with respect to how the UN conducts its peace operations. The second is to identify with some precision the types of changes which require implementation at every level of the system. While we emphasize that some of the recommendations can be implemented on their own, our decided preference is for an “across the board” approach to ensure that the reforms which Canada and others are advocating are ultimately effective.

The Idea of Rapid Reaction

In the Secretary-General’s 1992 study, *An Agenda for Peace*, he described the range of peace and security activities undertaken by the UN: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and enforcement action pursuant to Article 42. *An Agenda For Peace* explicitly distinguished between operations ranging from preventive diplomacy through peace enforcement undertaken in accordance with Article 40, and enforcement action pursuant to Article 42. In following the analysis of *An Agenda for Peace*, this report advances the case for a rapid-reaction capability which would be appropriate and enhance a full range of peace operations. For example, rapid response can be a key factor in cases of preventive deployment. The ability to deploy rapidly to buttress a recently-concluded ceasefire or peace agreement may be crucial to the re-establishment of peace and stability. Reinforcement of a faltering operation through recourse to a rapid-reaction capability will also be more likely to succeed if augmentation can be effected quickly.

Enforcement operations pursuant to Article 42 of the Charter, however are substantially different both quantitatively and qualitatively. They can be enormously large and complex, and demand a resource commitment far beyond current UN resources. They also raise difficult issues related to the provision of Article 43 forces. Such operations for the foreseeable future are essentially beyond the range of UN