

f) *The Geographic Setting: Fulda Gap/Intra-German Border*

The most suitable setting for an early warning system would appear to be in the Fulda Gap area with closely monitored limited forces zones established along the intra-German border as part of a disengagement and buffer zone arrangement. While the physical features of the Sinai and the Fulda Gap/Intra-German border are quite different, they are very similar in one crucial respect: both share terrain features that compel an adversary contemplating an attack to channel forces through narrow attack corridors.<sup>58</sup> In the Sinai, the Gidi and Mitla passes proved to be the only viable attack corridors. Similarly, in the central European setting, four principal attack corridors are available, each with its own natural barriers to rapid military advance.

It is at the entrances to these attack corridors, on either side of the border and in the Fulda area in particular, that early warning watch-stations, networks of unattended ground sensors and aerial/on-site inspection of limited forces zones could be situated. The greater number of available attack routes in the European setting would require more extensive use of watch-stations, unattended ground sensors and monitoring by aerial and space reconnaissance. (Of course, an extensive use of watch-stations raises the problem of "non-legitimate" intelligence gathering by these stations.) The need for greater use of surveillance technology could perhaps be managed through the introduction of new sensor technology developed since the Sinai experience. For example, watch-stations could now be remotely controlled and improved ground radars, imaging sensors and night-vision devices could enable the detection and classification of military movements, personnel or military equipment at a range of 10 to 20 km.<sup>59</sup>

g) *Extending the Concept of Limited-Forces Zones*

Zones that gradually thinned out military forces in order to reduce the threat of attack were an integral part of the Sinai experience. In Europe, specified zones from which particular forces would be banned or within which certain weapons could not be deployed, would be essential for the success of the enterprise. For example, along the intra-German border, an initial thin buffer/border zone could be limited to civilian national police and a small number of border patrol units. The early warning areas could be located in the attack-invasion corridors within this initial buffer zone. The next zone could allow limited military forces with the final zone, furthest from the border, reserved for standing armies. This last zone would incorporate the concept of rear-basing of tanks, artillery, bridging equipment, tactical strike aircraft and battlefield nuclear weapons.

The types of zones suggested here could be implemented even with persisting military asymmetries between East and West, though the task would be considerably more complicated than in the case of Egypt and Israel, especially given the presence of long-range weapons. Most importantly, the implementation of limited forces and buffer zones would constrain military options, dampen incentives to strike first and provide at least a marginal increase in the strategic and tactical warning time of attack. Such

<sup>58</sup> David Barton, "The Sinai Peacekeeping Experience", p. 558.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 553.

