

though in some cases the experts say inspection is essential. In negotiating disarmament, the parties have to judge whether they can accept less than 100 per cent proof that it will be observed, and what means of verification they will accept.

One of Canada's major contributions to the CD's work has been the preparation of a series of papers on verification. The first was a compendium of proposals that had been put forward over the years. This has been followed by a quantification paper and by a conceptual analysis of the problem. These have been very well received. It remains to be seen how far they will lay the foundation for acceptable verification procedures in future disarmament and arms control agreements.

CANADA'S CONTRIBUTION

What has been the Canadian contribution since UNSSOD I? Let us begin with the strategy of suffocation proposed by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau at that session. He said he was particularly concerned about the *"technological impulse"* that lay behind the development of strategic weapons because it was *"in the laboratories that the nuclear arms race begins"*. He proposed four measures, designed to deprive this arms race *"of the oxygen on which it feeds"*:

1. *"A comprehensive test ban to impede the further development of nuclear explosive devices."* As we have seen, negotiations have been in progress for several years and apparently there have been no new developments since UNSSOD I.
2. *"An agreement to stop the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles."* Aside from provisions in SALT II, no formal proposals to this end have been put forward.
3. *"An agreement to prohibit all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes."* Canada has introduced a resolution on this for the past three years. Some critics have raised questions about the possibility of verification, and