

Park, but which are about as useful to a soldier in action as a knowledge of the hornpipe would be, let us drill him day after day, and if necessary all day, in the manœuvres of battle, until he is proficient in them." In the same year poor Capt. May wrote his famous pamphlet scandalizing official Germany by propounding the theory that the very loosening of close order formations caused by the breech-loader in 1886 was not a thing to be deprecated and forbidden, but that, properly directed and controlled, it would be the fighting of the future. He fell before Metz, and will never experience the thrill of pride he would have felt on reading the official drill-book of the day. At last the absurdly unnecessary gulf between drill and tactics is bridged over, and German officers have received a book of instruction to teach them and those under them for war and not for parade. Let it be translated into our language as soon as possible, and read and re-read by every officer in our service. A comparison between it and our present drill-book will be found to be so ludicrous that the usual 10 or 20 years probation will be considerably shortened. Although we Englishmen cannot now boast the honour of having started a new state of things, we can at least point to a semi-official work written in 1869 in which many of the leading ideas are embodied.

In the "Battle of the Swash and the capture of Canada," just published in New York, Mr. Samuel Barton presents, on the lines of the "Battle of Dorking," an account of what happens in 1890, when the British fleet arrive off Sandy Hook, cross the bar and sail up the Swash and main ship channels. After they have swept away everything within reach night comes on and under the cover of the darkness powerful electric lights, fastened to spar buoys and fed by storage batteries, are sent floating down among the British vessels, which hastily open fire upon the supposed vessels carrying search lights. Taking advantage of the confusion thus created the *Vesuvius* slips out and sinks one vessel, when she is in her turn disabled by two fast gunboats firing 4-inch rapid guns. The *Destroyer* meets with a worse fate. After partially destroying two ironclads she goes down head first and never comes up. The British fleet is finally driven off by two naval rams, which utterly destroy with dynamite two of their vessels. But they return and bombard New York, while the American fleet takes refuge up the river at Yonkers. The author's purpose is to stimulate the agitation of the question of providing for building up the U.S. merchant marine, as an auxiliary to the navy. As a means of introducing himself to the good graces of Congress Mr. Barton presents this dedication: "To the Senators and ex-Senators, members and ex-members, of past and present Congresses of the United States of America, who, by their stupid and criminal neglect to adopt ordinary defensive precautions, or to encourage the reconstruction of the American Merchant Marine, have rendered all American seaport towns liable to such an attack as is herein but faintly and imperfectly described, this historical forecast is dedicated, with much indignation and contempt, and little or no respect."

The autumn manœuvres of the 6th French Army Corps take place on a line extending from Vouziers (Ardennes) over Sainte Ménéhould (Marne) to Sainte Mihiel (Meuse), a line running almost parallel to the river Meuse, and to the railway from Mézières to Thionville. Altogether 38 battalions of infantry, 12 squadrons of cavalry, 12 batteries of field artillery, and two companies of engineers will take part in the manœuvres, under the command of General Février.

Gal 2 con. art.

The Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria while witnessing some target practice near Vienna, Sept. 28th, came pretty near being shot. He had ordered the bugle to sound cease firing in order that he might inspect the target. The officer in command of a battery situated 1000 yards away did not hear the signal, and as it was impossible for him to see the Emperor as he advanced owing to the depression in the ground, the battery again fired. Fortunately the Emperor and his suite were out of the line of fire.

Canadian History vs. General Butler.

(By J. Elton Prower.)

General Benjamin F. Butler's article in *The North American Review*, called "Defenceless Canada," exceeds in carelessness if not ignorance in the statement of facts any article on the subject which I have ever read. That an American General should be so ignorant of the most important military events of Canadian history may excite the surprise of the foreigner, but when the same general presumes to write on Canadian affairs the article should hardly be allowed to pass without comment.

Of course he has a right to his opinion as to the conduct of the British Government being "disingenuous, cowardly and selfish" with regard to the South at the time of the war. There is no doubt that the large leisure class in England had a sentimental sympathy with the great Southern landlords, and many British subjects both at home and in the colonies looked forward to a possible time when Canada would hold the balance of power on this continent, but these opinions were by no means universal either in Britain or the colonies, and in any case they were somewhat natural and justifiable.

But to take his historical "facts." General Butler is anxious to prove that the winter is the proper time for a successful Canadian invasion, and says: "At the time of the invasion of Canada by Wolfe, in 1759, he made preparations for a winter campaign, waiting as long as he dared to get up the St. Lawrence without being impeded by frosts, and he landed above Quebec about the 10th of September, with the intention of besieging Quebec, the best fortified city in North America. He evidently reckoned upon supporting his troops largely from the resources I have indicated." These resources were the well filled larders and granaries of the French Canadians.

Now there is everything in history to indicate that Wolfe's plan was to take Quebec by bombardment and a "coup de main," and when his first attack—the one by the Montmorency and the Beauport flats—failed, a council of war was held and the general opinion seems to have favoured sailing away and giving the whole thing up until the next open season. Even the forlorn hope at Wolfe's Cove seems to have come completely as an afterthought, a suggestion of General Monkton's. The only foundation for the idea of a winter campaign on that occasion appears to be a vague suggestion to fortify and occupy Isle au Condro by a few troops provisioned by the fleet until the next spring.

To continue, General Butler says: "He (Wolfe) could have had no thought or belief that the rash and too brave Montcalm, almost within an hour one might say, could quit the shelter and protection of the thick walls of Quebec and its heavy artillery and deploy the French troops on the Plains of Abraham, and thus trust himself and his country's cause on the result of a man for man fight to repel the dashing charge of the impetuous English General."

Would General Butler be very much surprised to learn that General Wolfe and his army on arriving at the heights were very much nearer the "thick walls of Quebec and its heavy artillery," than either Montcalm or his troops, and that the battle was almost won when the sun rose to find Montcalm and his army eight or nine miles off at Beauport and on the Montmorency, while the English army was deployed on ground which not only commanded Montcalm's whole camp but also the City of Quebec, and was within a mile and a half of the very walls. The truth is that Montcalm was compelled to fight at once or give up the game, as in twenty-four hours' time the British army would have been entrenched on what is perhaps the very strongest ground in North America, and from where all the armies of France could not have dislodged them. He was far too good a general to trust his "rabble" (as I think he called it) in a hand-to-hand conflict with the trained veterans of Wolfe, when it could be avoided, and he was right, as, although he had some very fine French regiments with him, far the larger part of his force consisted of half armed and half disciplined militia totally unaccustomed to fight in the open. The heights were the key of Montcalm's great entrenched camp, and when the attack on the English position failed the French army, shattered and routed, retired, not on Quebec, which could not have held them, but across the St. Charles to the low ground of Beauport flats.

Let us quote once more from General Butler. In showing how much more ready the chivalrous New Englander is to respond to the call to war compared to his dull, money-making cousin who prefers the ancient institutions of his ancestors, he says:

"Later on when England called upon the loyalty of her colonies to assist her by furnishing troops to fight an unjust war against some naked Negroes in Africa, Canada answered the call after a month's delay, by furnishing volunteers of all descriptions to the extent of one regiment of fighting men and some boatmen, her population then exceeding 4,000,000."

Did England call for assistance to her colonies? The contrary was the case. Many Canadian volunteers offered their services and well got