

know where, in all that time, were the Orange Tory leaders of Ontario? I want to know whether they were helping in the cause which I have been vindicated in the end? I want to know whether they were expressing and actively manifesting their sympathy with those who were struggling for the rights which have at length been accorded them? It is not so; it is known not to be so. It is true that many of the Protestants of Quebec came to the assistance of the Liberals of Quebec in that struggle, but the Orange Tory leaders of Ontario were unflinching in their support and in their consort with the very members who were waging that controversy against the Quebec Liberals. Why? Because they were united in political bonds with those members; because they rejoiced in their success at the polls, although that success was purchased from those with whom they professed to be in sympathy. They were kept in place and power by means of that partnership, and therefore they were untrue to the principles which they professed, and which they are now saying they wish to be incorporated, in order to promote. I have declared my views on this subject, and I have nothing to recall in regard to them. I have shown where I am to be found in case any conflict may arise in which any church, whether Roman Catholic or Episcopalian, or Presbyterian, or what you will, shall strive to encroach on what I believe to be the just domain of the State. I believe, if you commit to any church absolute power and control over the moral point of view at the same time, you commit to that church absolute power to determine what is comprised within faith and morals, you concede necessarily to that church absolute power altogether; and I believe, therefore, that it is quite necessary to consider that there may be a point at which we may be called on to consider what the tenets of the church in that particular point of view are. I have shown that the struggle was worked out within that church; that those rights on which the Liberals of Lower Canada insisted have been vindicated and the electors have a right to vote as free men. But should such a struggle recur, which God forbid! should I, judging from the past, hope for any assistance, could the Liberal party look with hope for any assistance from the Orange Tory leaders of Ontario? No; because they have not received it in the past and whatever their views, they subordinated them altogether to party politics, which led them to rejoice in the triumphs of those who were perpetuating principles directly opposed to their own. There are some other reasons which lead me to think that this society in Ontario is not a beneficial one. Its leaders claim a monopoly, not merely of true Protestantism, but also of loyalty. The hon. member for East Hastings (Mr. White), at Winnipeg, said:—

"One of his reasons was, that with three others, he had opposed the Costigan resolution, which was a direct insult to the Mother Country, and to every loyal citizen in the country, except party leaders on both sides an members who were rendering to the Catholic vote, and not one member of the Orange society said, well done."

Grand Master Bennett said: "You are no doubt aware that a most singular combination was formed at the last Session to defeat the Bill. We had the Liberalism and Ultramontanism in alliance to defeat it. Liberalism, because of the loyalty of Orangemen, and Ultramontanism, because of the advanced Protestantism of the Orange order."

There you have it, Sir, laid down as a rule, that because Orangemen are loyal, and loyalty is so offensive to others, that they must be put down by force. I maintain that that is an inflexible statement, and that a secret society which devotes itself to the propagation of such opinions as these, as to the loyalty of others, is one which does not deserve favour or State recognition. There is another reason. They claim that their object is to advance Protestantism, and they claim to advance it by assertions with reference to the Roman Catholic Church, which I believe to be baseless. And here again I do not propose to deal with dogmatic assertions. I do not propose to deal with assertions with respect to religion, as to whether certain views are right or wrong, for we have nothing to do with them. But we have to do with their views as to the tenets of that church, as they affect the political condition and social order of the country. Those things are of material to us, and it is well that we should know what is advanced in the name of Protestantism, or with a view of promoting it, by the leaders of the Orange society in Ontario. In the Sentinel of 21st September, 1882, there is the following, which is headed "Allegiance to Rome only."

"We have always considered the Roman Church teaches its followers to be disloyal to every State wherein it exists, to recognize the authority of no temporal Government, and to own allegiance only to the Papacy."

On April 26th, 1883, the same paper said: "It is hardly necessary to say that every true member of the church must be loyal to the Pope, the inflexible head of the church, unquestioning obedience in morals, dogmatic faith or belief, and also conduct in civil affairs."

"No member of the church can dispute the right of the head of it to decide infallibly and dogmatically all questions affecting temporal power in Governments, any more than he can that of the faith and belief put forth in her teachings."

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Written for the Record. UTILITARIANISM vs. NATURAL MORALITY.

By P. Ryan and W. L. Scott.

The following dialogue was presented at a philosophical session, given by the students of the senior philosophy class of the college of Ottawa, on the anniversary of the feast of St. Thomas Aquinas, March 6th, 1884.

Note. In order to give Utilitarianism a fair hearing, most of the arguments in favor of that system have been taken, some of them verbatim, from the writings of John Stuart Mill.

ANTI-UTILITARIAN.—At our last meeting, sir, we touched slightly on the subject of the true foundation of morals, and, if I mistake not, you appeared to be favorably inclined towards the system known as Utilitarianism. As the subject, on account of its direct bearing on our everyday life, and of the number of advocates it counts, even in the very society in which we live, is one of the utmost importance, would it not be well, provided you have no objection, to continue our discussion this evening and to examine a few of the principal points in connection with that system?

UTILITARIAN.—With all my heart. Your conjecture that my opinions are favorable to the system of morals known as Utilitarianism is perfectly correct; and, far from entertaining any objections to a discussion on the subject, nothing would give me greater pleasure than the elucidating of a doctrine which I consider one of the most valuable out-growths of modern progress, and the coming mainstay of a society much more perfect in every respect than the one we now enjoy.

A. I apprehend, then, that the first thing to be done is to understand each other clearly, and to settle definitely the point at issue. I will begin, therefore, by asking you to define precisely what you mean by utilitarianism.

U. And I must begin by stating what it is not, and correcting a glaring error in the popular conception of the term. At the present day, among unscientific persons, the word utilitarianism has, unfortunately, come to possess a meaning very widely at variance with its true sense. It has come to be considered as a doctrine advocating "utility," or "what is useful," as opposed to what is simply enjoyable. For instance, when any public square has to give way before the encroachments of the thoroughfares of commerce; or when governments refuse to expend the public money on parks, or other accessories to public recreation and pleasure, people are wont to lament the "utilitarian" tendencies of the age. This is simply a misconception of the meaning of the word, as nothing can be further from the object of the doctrine of utility.

In this system the word utility is taken as synonymous with happiness or pleasure, under any form whatever; and the object of it is to prove that utility, or pleasure, or happiness is the criterion or standard of morality, that is to say, that actions are not good or bad, right or wrong in themselves, but that they are right in proportion as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness I mean pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.

The theory of life, therefore, on which this theory of morality is grounded, is that pleasure and the freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous under the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. In short, that pleasure is the summum bonum.

first to carry the doctrine to its full limits and to hold absolutely that every right and every duty flow from utility. He also admitted the just consequence that moral laws were not immutable, but might change with the changing interests of society.

A. So that what is immoral to-day, might, by to-morrow, come to be in the highest degree laudable. Do I understand you aright?

U. Precisely, such was Hume's opinion, and such a transformation from evil to good, or good to evil, I believe to be quite possible.

Paley, whilst adopting the principles of the infidel Hume, christianized them, and proved them to be consonant with revelation. He held that we were placed on earth to carry out the will of God; and, as God wishes the happiness of his creatures, we are bound to do everything in our power to contribute towards the happiness of our fellow-men. From this he easily deduced the principle that whatever is expedient is right.

A. But, sir, Paley is not consistent. He admitted, and stated, the existence of natural rights, "such as would belong to man, although there subsisted in the world no civil government whatever." He here touches, though he does not recognize, a deeper principle of morals than utility. For these rights, independent of society, suppose correlative duties, dependent upon the same natural laws, and, consequently, perfectly independent of utility. This is sufficient to refute his system.

U. I cannot endorse Paley's admission of natural rights, such as you mention; but as I am not an especial admirer of his, and only mention him en passant, as one who contributed his mite to the development of the system, I will not discuss the point further, but will continue my historical retrospect.

Bentham, the next great name we meet in the history of utilitarian philosophy, was more nearly epicurean than any of the other modern utilitarians. He based his system of morals on the most prominent principles of that school, pleasure and pain. These two he considered as the rulers of the world. On them depend not only morality, but all human actions, so that every human act may be traced to these sources. To Bentham science and humanity owe an eternal debt of gratitude, as the originator of that principle of all principles, that "the greatest happiness of morals and legislation" is subsequently abbreviated as "the greatest happiness principle."

The theory received further development from Mackintosh, Austin and others, but it found its most powerful champion in John Stuart Mill. The immortal Mill has done more for humanity than any other man—he he hero, legislator or philosopher—of modern times. He has pointed out to society the high road to happiness, he has given it the means of attaining to a perfect state of existence, where all will contribute to the happiness of all, and the whole world of rational beings will be united in one loving brotherhood.

A. That is all very well for oratory. But you must remember that it is one thing to perfect a utopian system, and another to reduce it to practice. But, since Mill is evidently, for you, the utilitarian par excellence, will you tell us in what his doctrine consists.

U. Mill adopts the greatest happiness principle of Bentham, enlarges upon it and reduces it to a perfect system. His formula is, act in such a manner that, in seeking your own happiness, you work for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Happiness, as before observed, is here taken as pleasure, and the absence of pain, and is synonymous with utility.

A. And how does Mr. Mill prove his system?

U. The first principle, like all others which concern first principles, is not susceptible of direct proof in the ordinary acceptance of the term; for I think you will admit, sir, that to be incapable of direct proof by reasoning, one of the main characteristics of a first principle. But as it is a simple matter of facts, it may be safely settled by an appeal to facts. Utilitarians say that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable as an end, and that all other things which are desired, are sought only as means to the attainment of this end. If, therefore, this be not in accordance with facts—by an appeal to their own consciousness and experience, people do not discover that they act only on account of this end, they will certainly not be convinced by the mere assertions of utilitarian philosophers.

That pleasure or happiness is sometimes desired as an end, cannot, I think, be reasonably denied. It only, therefore, remains to be proved that it is always desired as an end, and it is the only thing that is so desired. Now it is quite palpable that people do desire things which, in the common language, are very different from pleasure. Virtue, and the absence of vice, for instance, are desired; and although the desire of virtue is not as universal as that of pleasure, yet it is nevertheless an undeniable fact. But do utilitarians seek to deny this? The very reverse. They teach not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired for itself. Whatever may be the opinions of utilitarians as to how virtue came to be desired, and vice to be vice, after it has been decided what is virtue, they place it at the very head of the things which are means to the ultimate end, and they also recognize the fact that it may become a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it. This is perfectly consistent with the happiness principle. Happiness is made up of a great many ingredients, and each of them is desirable in itself—they form part of the end, as well as being means to its attainment.

Virtue is not naturally and originally part of the end, but is capable of becoming so; and, in those who love it disinterestedly, it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a means to happiness but as part of happiness itself. It is precisely the same for all other ends of human actions, (such, for instance, as money) which, originally, only means to the attainment of the end, come finally to be part of the end itself. Happiness, then, under one form or another, is the supreme and only end of human actions, and must, therefore, be the supreme criterion of the morality of those actions; for the fitness of means is necessarily judged by reference to the end for which they are

intended. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. But, so strong is the feeling of sympathy and the love of his fellows in man, that the greatest happiness of the individual may, and, in a proper state of society, with proper education, should become identical with the happiness of the greatest number.

So much for the theory of the system; all that remains is to put it into practice. To do this we have merely to observe what actions, or classes of actions, tend to the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and the reverse, and to declare the former to be virtuous and the latter vicious. The philosophy of utility is purely an experimental one, and its practical conclusions are drawn entirely from observation.

I will give you, in as few words as possible, my appreciation of your system. To begin with its very foundation, it is based on the principle that happiness, or pleasure, in this life is the supreme end of man. Now, if we examine the very nature of happiness, taken in the sense of pleasure, we find that it cannot be the real object of any human action; for a very definition is "an agreeable sensation following the attainment of an object. Now, since pleasure is the consequence of the attainment of an object, it cannot itself constitute that object.

U. But can you deny that man, in common with all sentient beings, seeks primarily pleasure and avoids pain? A. I do deny it; and do not see how a utilitarian, a purely experimental philosopher, can assert it. For how can man seek primarily pleasure and avoid pain when primarily he knows nothing at all about either the one or the other? How can an experimentalist say that primarily (i.e. before he has experienced them) man seeks pleasure and avoids pain, which, if we gain our knowledge by experiment, he does not, as yet, know. Primarily man seeks only that which is necessary to him. Now two things are necessary to him, existence and action. Existence is necessary to him, for without it he is not, and he is driven by the strongest impulse of his nature to preserve it. Action is necessary, for the performance of this duty is a sense of pleasure. This pleasure, then, cannot be the object of our actions; and indeed, when man perfects himself he increases his being. Now, while nature imposes upon man the necessity of self-preservation, she, like a good mother, who puts jam on the bread of her child, annexes to the performance of this duty a sense of pleasure. This pleasure, then, cannot be the object of our actions; and indeed, when men, by adherence to correct principles, make this pleasure, which is altogether secondary, their primary object then it is that they become vicious. The man who eats in order to live may be virtuous; he who lives in order to eat, is necessarily vicious. The system of utility is, therefore, psychologically unstable. But this is not my principal objection to your system. I have a less metaphysical, but much stronger argument against it. I hear no mention of God or an after life in your philosophy. Yet it is needless for me to tell you, who are a Christian, that the final end of man is not of this world. Man is a being created by God, and therefore, like all other created things, he must tend towards that supernatural creator, as his final end. Nevertheless, man is not like the other animals, like the plants, or inorganic beings. These, destitute of intellect or free will, tend towards their end necessarily. But man has an intellect, by which he can apprehend the end for which he was created and choose the means to attain that end. Thus, the intellect of man is the instrument by which he must arrive at his supernatural end, which is God. And, since the manner in which the intellect embraces anything is by understanding it, the manner in which the intellect of man must attain God is by understanding him. Man, therefore, since the intellect, as man acquires more and more the knowledge of God, he must allude to God more and more with his will. Thus, we see that the two chief faculties of the human soul, and therefore, the noblest part of the human person, are perfected. And thus, in having God for their object, they have at the same time for their end, which he pleases to will, to understand God, and to love him, is to give to the intellect and will a most universal object.

U. But we utilitarians are not constructing a system of morals for the next world, but are only pointing out the practical and only true moral code for society and individuals in the present life.

A. But, my dear Sir, you cannot separate the idea of a supernatural end from your moral code. This life is for the next life or it is for nothing. And therefore, as there is but one end for man, namely, the attainment of perfection, all our free actions must have this end in view. In neglecting then, all thought of a supernatural end, the system of utility errs greatly.

U. The same system is deficient also in its basis. A principle whether of speculative or moral science must rely on a criterion which is real, clear, determinate and immutable, not merely ideal, vague and variable, according to age, nation and individual. The idea of supreme happiness does not satisfy these conditions. It is not real because complete happiness in this world is impossible. A continued series of ills for the body, ending inevitably by death, and disappointments of the will, and of unsatisfied cravings of the intellect, this is the life of man. And therefore, the idea of supreme happiness proposed by your system is merely ideal and incapable of realization.

U. But by happiness is not meant a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement, a state of existence which we can feel only at moments, or, at best, hours, or days; not a life of rapture, but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and varied pleasures, not expecting more from life than it is capable of bestowing. And moreover, sir, if the present life were such a series of miseries as you depict, suicides would be far more frequent than we find them to be.

A. Then, sir, your supreme happiness is not, sir, supreme happiness at all, since it is mixed with pain, as happiness in this world always is. As to suicides, it is not

so much the love of this world as the fear of the next which prevents them.

"The fear of something after death—The discovery of our sins, from whose burden No traveler returns,—puzzles the will And makes us rather bear the ills we have Than fly to others which we know not of."

I do not think you can deny, sir, that the principle of supreme happiness is also vague and indeterminate, varying according to age, nation and person. The roving eyes of certain nations, the domestic hearth; the Swiss is unhappy if deprived of it; Lycurgus thought happiness to consist in physical development, while Plotinus, the Alexandrine mystic, esteemed his soul so much that he blushed at having a body. Among ourselves we see tastes as widely different; some of us enjoy reading, quiet conversation, or solitude, others at ease only in the midst of noise and excitement. Yet each derives pleasure from his favorite enjoyment. I conclude with Herbert Spencer that "nothing is more variable than the principle of greatest happiness. At each epoch, in every country, and in every social class, different ideas are formed of it."

U. I know, of course, that men differ in the particular application of general principles of happiness, but all, nevertheless, have the same general idea of it; otherwise it would be impossible to explain how the world happiness came to exist in every language.

A. I will ask you then to define well what you mean by happiness. If it have wholly a subjective meaning, or, as some of the moralists of our day say, if it be only "the feeling of our own power," then as there are many different objects upon which our power may be exercised with the same amount of subjective pleasure, I persist in saying that the idea of happiness is vague, confused and indeterminate. If, on the contrary, happiness is to be measured by the object, then I ask "why certain objects make our actions more moral than others?" Christian moral philosophy says that it is because they perfect us; but you utilitarians exclude the idea of perfection from your system. And if you make happiness entirely subjective, I do not see how you keep from epicureanism. But the greatest difficulty to your system is to explain the principle of justice and right which govern the moral judgments of men in all ages and nations, and the constant, immutable character of which cannot be reduced to any consideration of utility. The formula, "act so that, in seeking your own interest you may contribute to the greatest happiness of the greatest number," is but a mere counsel and a very indeterminate one at that. But the precept "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not kill," are absolute, and immediately call down punishment upon the head of the offender.

U. Mr. Bain and Stuart Mill explain admirably this idea of justice, and bring it into perfect harmony with their system. In the beginning, men based their idea of justice on the law. Their superstition surrounded the precepts of the law with a sort of divine sacredness. But after ages dispelled this superstitious attribution of a divine character to what were mere human precepts. And as the conviction forced itself upon men, that law might be unjust, they began to designate as unjust, not what was opposed to the law, but what was opposed to what the law ought to be. Now

A. Hold there, my friend. I think your words condemn you. Where did you get this idea of what the law "ought to be"? Where did they find this idea of "ought," of duty, of obligation, in short, of justice? Is it not evident that when men say that the law ought to be such, they declare that the law must ordain what is conformable to something external to the law, which he will be bound to do, which is nothing else than the idea of justice? But how does Stuart Mill or Mr. Bain explain the immutability of justice and the energy with which we always call for punishment against the evil-doer?

U. Simply by the combination of two natural instincts: first, the feelings of resentment which man entertains towards anyone who injures him, or in any way threatens his peace, following naturally from the instinct of personal preservation, enjoyed by man in common with all other animals; and second, the feelings of sympathy with his fellow-beings, with which the social interests of man inspire him. The union of these two give him his idea of justice, by which he resents an attack whether it be directed against himself or against one of his fellow-beings.

A. But you cannot reduce the idea of justice to its accompanying sanction to a mere movement of animal instinct. It is not an irrational instinct but a rational judgment which says that injustice must be punished. The impulse of returning evil for evil—for the mere animal instinct in nothing more—is modified as man becomes more cultivated; but the judgment which declares that an infraction of justice deserves punishment remains unchanged. If I follow my mere animal instinct I will attack a person who accidentally runs against me in the street; but the moral judgment suppresses the knowledge of the intention of the offender. And if he has been guilty of an intentional attack against my person, I may indeed forgive him, but I cannot conceive him as not meriting punishment.

Nor can you explain the idea of justice by the sympathy of man with his fellow-man. For, sir, in your system, there is no real obligation for the individual to look after his own interests. You tell him that it will obtain him more pleasure to do so, but that does not obligate him. For a much stronger reason he is not obliged to look after the good of the community, whose interests are greater than his own, only in number. Yet it is evident that we are conscious of possessing rights which we require others to respect; and we place rights in others which we feel bound to respect in turn. This, then, must be in virtue of some higher principle than mere utility. But I think it can be proven in many ways that the system of utility is, not only inapplicable, but inapplicable and impracticable. If a man has to reflect before every particular action to find out first whether it will diminish the amount of pain or increase the stock of pleasure, he will be far more frequent than we find them to be.

A. Then, sir, your supreme happiness is not, sir, supreme happiness at all, since it is mixed with pain, as happiness in this world always is. As to suicides, it is not

there is the whole of preceding ages, during which mankind may decide what classes of actions tend to the general happiness. It is truly whimsical to suppose that men, believing that useful actions were good, would leave it to the last moment to decide what actions were useful. It might as well be said that the Scriptures were not a guide to morality since a man would have no time to read them up before performing an action. Any system of morality may be proven impracticable if we suppose all men to be lunatics.

A. Though the Christian philosopher believes in the infallibility of the Scriptures he does not regard them as the supreme criterion of truth, either speculative or practical. Secondly, the Scriptures teach an ethical code which is immutable, and can therefore be taught to man from his early years. But utilitarianism, as you yourself said, admits the mutability of morality. Now, if morality be mutable there can be no general conclusions concerning it. Therefore a man would have to consider at each particular action of his, and then without being very certain of his conclusion.

Now, if a man cannot know well whether his action will or will not be beneficial, since he is generally able and willing to see only its immediate results—the consequence will be that he will care nothing for the morality of his action, but suit his own whims; or, what is worse, the timid will hesitate to act, while the bold adventurer will impose his will upon the multitude under pretence of its being conducive to the public welfare. Thus, the good is cloaked under the appearance of virtue.

U. But you must admit that, under any system of morals whatever, men are found who, when personal interests are at stake, will unblushingly overstep the bounds of morality.

A. I indeed admit it; but with a distinct system of utility, an immoral action, since it can be judged only by its consequences, can be performed under the name of virtue. But in the Christian system of morals, vice is vice from the beginning. In the latter system, a man may violate his conscience, but he himself and everybody else will know that he is doing wrong. In the former, a man will say to his fellowmen: "I am going to perform this action; it is a moral one, and I defy you to prove it to be otherwise."

There is absolutely no such thing in your system, sir, as obligation. You try to induce man to virtue by holding out to him such attractions as his health, his happiness, or the happiness of his fellows. But you have nothing which obliges man to virtue. This is the necessary result of a godless system like yours.

U. How can you call our system a godless one. Does not God wish the happiness of his creatures?

A. God wishes the final happiness of man in the next world. He may or may not wish his happiness in this life, for earthly misery is very often the means of keeping man from the paths of vice, and no man can be perfect who has not been purified, and energized by the trying fires of misfortune.

"The cruel fire of sorrow Cast thy heart, do not faint or wail; Let thy hand be steady Do not let thy spirit quail. But wait till the trial is over And take thy heart again; For as gold must be tried by fire, So the heart must be tried by pain."

But even the inducements which you hold out to virtue are insufficient. A short life of pain, and an unhappy death, as the result of excess, and a long life of health, as the consequence of virtue, are surely wholly insufficient as sanctions for virtue, besides the fact that they are not always true. A man, free from the cares of family and state, and who knows how to economize his excesses, may live to the age of a hundred years. But suppose a man of an ardent temperament, loaded with the cares of family, of state, or of education, continually laboring, who, crushed by work, sinks after a long and painful illness to an early grave. Which of the two is the more moral man—evidently the latter.

U. Nevertheless, sir, I do not think that you can deny that virtue is worth its reward and vice its punishment. Leave virtue to itself and happiness will be its necessary consequence; leave vice to itself and it will surely be followed by miseries. You know the verse: "Haro antecedentem sceleratum Deseruit pede pœna cœlestis."

In a spite of poets and utilitarians, I must deny the assertion that virtue is invariably followed by happiness or vice by misfortune, in this world. Why, sir, the pages of history are filled by a long series of unexpiated crimes, the evil consequences of which were often borne by innocent people. Louis XVI. of France, suffered for the fault of Louis XV. Now, if I am not assured that virtue necessarily brings its reward in this world, what motive have I for virtue in the science of utility?

U. But the sanction on which we utilitarians mainly rely, is an internal one, far more powerful than those which you have mentioned. It is the social sentiment which is based on the sympathy which each individual has for his fellow-creatures. As Mr. Mill truly observes, this sentiment may be so developed by education and social circumstances, as to combine the interests of the individual with those of the community, so that in seeking the happiness of his fellows, a man at the same time would seek his own.

A. Still, sir, for the present there are cases in which the interests of the individual are opposed to those of the community. And since, in your system, there is no obligation by which man is bound to seek the welfare of the community, in such cases, he will simply attend to his own interests and let other men look out for themselves. I do not think that such a state of society as you theorize upon could be brought about. But supposing it possible, it would simply destroy in your system all disinterestedness and therefore real virtue, since man would then act for the general good, not because it would be for his own interest, although his own interest happened to correspond to that of the community.

U. But whatever objections you may urge against the doctrine of utility, it is at least a complete practical system, offering a guide in all cases and covering all circumstances. Can the same be said of the system of natural morality? Continued on page six.