

5. Mr. Chakravarty, however, called today to say that on reporting his conversation with us to New Delhi he had received word today that the Indian Government was equally concerned to prevent a deadlock at Geneva over the nuclear test talks and that the Indian Representative was engaged in both bilateral talks as well as consultations with the other representatives of uncommitted countries with a view to working out a compromise proposal on verification. He added the information that Mr. Krishna Menon was expected to go to Geneva either next week or the week after.

6. None of these representatives expressed any definite opinion as to whether or not the Geneva Conference would break down if nuclear testing were resumed, but agreed that the resumption of tests by the United States would be a serious set-back and that special efforts would be required to keep it going. Mr. Chakravarty thought that there was a real danger that the Soviet Union might walk out of the conference if the U.S.A. resumed testing.

N.A. R[OBERTSON]

26.

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*Le président des États-Unis  
au premier ministre*

*President of United States  
to Prime Minister*

CONFIDENTIAL

Washington, April 13, 1962

Dear Prime Minister:

I was glad that Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Heeney had a good talk on disarmament and nuclear testing last Tuesday. For some time I have had an uneasy feeling that perhaps the positions of our two countries were becoming increasingly disparate on the nuclear test question. We were therefore happy to hear your views and to have an opportunity to present ours. In this letter I would like to follow up on what Secretary Rusk said.

Nuclear testing confronts the West with a choice between two tragic alternatives. One alternative is to refrain from atmospheric testing, but this gives the Soviet Union the freedom to continue the pursuit of military superiority. The other alternative is to resume atmospheric testing, but this ensures that for a time, at least, this race for military superiority with all its inherent instability will continue and will perhaps be accentuated.

I know that this second alternative is a source of grave concern for yourself and for Mr. Green. I know that it is this concern which has motivated you in your conduct of Canada's participation in the Geneva disarmament negotiations and in your statements as reported from Canada.

No government in the world wants a nuclear test ban agreement more than the United States. I believe that during the year since March 1961 the United States, through its performance in the Geneva test ban negotiations, has demonstrated the truth of this. But the United States also has the responsibility before its own people and the people of its forty allies and, indeed, before the non-aligned countries as well, to maintain the balance of power between the Soviet bloc and the free world.