different Provinces to place that matter under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. That seemed to be an anomaly. We had been told that it was very desirable to have some tribunal to which could be referred those disputed questions of jurisdiction between the Local Legislatures and the Dominion Parliament. But in looking at the bill he found that so far from the Supreme Court having in itself power to consider whether an act of the Local Legislature or the Dominion Parliament was *ultra vires* or not, it had no power to decide upon any of those questions until laws were passed by the different Provinces. This was a very serious defect in the bill. He would have supposed that the first power given to this Court would have been an absolute power to determine the question of constitutionality or otherwise. Coming to the practical working of the bill he found—assuming that this court was to have jurisdiction over civil rights as a matter of appeal—a most extraordinary provision in it, that where a trial had taken place of rights between parties, there was no power to appeal to the Supreme Court against the result of that trial unless on the single ground of misdirection of a judge. Where the weight of evidence might be altogether on one side the party could have no remedy at all unless he took it under another section, which put it in the power of a judge in the court below, under special circumstances and by a special application, to grant an appeal. Another curious anomaly was that these judges performed the functions of a double court—on the one hand a Court of Appeal, and on the other a Court of Exchequer—and yet there was an appeal from all decisions of the Court of Exchequer to the same judges sitting in the Supreme Court. Another inconsistency was that this bill required all those judges to live at Ottawa. He was not aware of any such rule in England, or in any of the Provinces of the Dominion which required all the judges to live in one place. He thought it would be better to have them reside in different parts of the Dominion. Here, for the first time, we found one tribunal, centralized in Ottawa, one which enabled the Government of the day to bring cases before a single judge in any part of this Dominion, to have the single judge declare, not only the law, but the fact, without the intervention of a jury between man and man. That he considered a very serious defect. Another important feature was that in the Province of Quebec there must be a claim of at least $2,000 to invoke the aid of the court, while in any other part of the Dominion a man might be dragged up to the city of Ottawa before this court for the most trifling damages. Another objection was that this bill gave the judges of this court unlimited power to fix the scale of costs in their discretion. He was not aware that in any other tribunal in this country there was such a power. In all other cases the costs were fixed by the Act which gave power to the court. He next alluded to the 42nd section, which his hon. friend (Mr. Scott) had called the sentimental clause, which, for the first time, took away from the people the right of appeal from the mother land. His hon. friend must recollect that after all the world was very much governed by sentiment, especially in a matter of this kind. We were jealous of having the smallest link torn apart that ties us—with a silken thread, it might be—to the mother land. (Hear, hear.) This clause was of a highly objectionable character, and when we came to look at it as British subjects we would be the last to desire to take away the right which enabled us to go to the fountain of justice on the other side of the water. It might be a mere silken tie, but it bound willing hearts on both sides of the Atlantic. It gave us a refuge where we might resort for justice when we could not get it on this side of the water. His hon. friend had used as an argument for the bill the fact that very few cases had hitherto been carried to the Privy Council. That very fact was one of the strongest arguments against the necessity of the bill. As regarded Quebec, from the present position of the Bench in that Province, there was not likely to be so many appeals as in time past. Then there was the question of expense. For instance, he saw in the Supply Bill an item of $3,000 for books to commence with. There was a prospect

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