

economic stability in Korea so long as it remained divided. Yet it might never have been unified had it not been for the North Korean aggression. This is possibly a case in which evil may eventually bring about good.

In the second place, the resolution states the determination of the United Nations to prevent this unhappy, war-ravaged country from becoming a breeding ground for misery and disorder. On the contrary, it is intended, in the first instance, to bring emergency aid to its suffering people and, at a second stage, the United Nations, through its appropriate agencies, is to develop plans for the rehabilitation of the Korean economy. And yet, it seems to us to be abundantly clear that there is no thought of establishing anything in the nature of a continuing protectorate, or, indeed, a protectorate of any kind, over Korea, either by the United Nations or any of its members.

The Korean people are, of course, new to democratic political life. They may make mistakes. If they do, they will certainly not be the only people to do so. However, their fate must now be in their own hands. The United Nations commission, which is called for in this resolution, is to help them in working out their own destiny. I would say only this about that commission our delegation has long expressed the view that, in the political aspects of the peace settlement in Korea, the Asian members of the United Nations have an outstanding contribution to make, and we hope they will be given an opportunity to make that contribution in this commission.

Now I should like to say a few words about the resolution standing in the name of the five delegations. I would suggest that, if those delegations were to read objectively and sincerely the eight-power resolution, they would find in it that which they purport to desire - provision for a free and independent Korea and provision for achieving that in a manner which will ensure that it will happen. The Soviet resolution seems to us to fall very short of ensuring it and is designed - or, if it is not designed, it seems to us it is bound - to create chaos, confusion, uncertainty and trouble. And we know who benefits from a situation of that kind.

The first operative provision of the resolution asks the belligerents in Korea to cease hostilities immediately. Well, that has been done by the Security Council, and we know the result of the appeal made by the Security Council to the effect that hostilities should cease. I do not know whether Mr. Vishinsky has more confidence that this appeal would meet with an effective reception in the eyes of the aggressor now than it met with two or three months ago.

The second provision of the resolution recommends to:
". . . the Governments of the United States and the Governments of other States that they immediately withdraw their troops from Korea and thereby establish conditions which would secure for the Korean people the possibility of enjoying the inalienable sovereign right to settle freely the internal affairs of their State".

Immediate withdrawal of United Nations forces would not have that result, but might very well have the opposite result. This means that the United Nations forces are to be