

argued that such options must always be kept open in case opportunities for unilateral action or working inside Burma suddenly appear.

Policy options in these areas, it was said by **Peter Globensky** of Associates to Develop Democratic Burma could be evaluated by whether they *aid, abet, or impede* Burma's democratic development, and whether they would permit Canada to proceed with the greatest flexibility. There was a consensus that policy options which would encourage Canada to develop and maintain a *creative, visible, and active role* in and around Burma were most desirable. Selecting the appropriate policy tools to use to apply pressure on SLORC requires a careful assessment of *benefits, risks and costs* to Canada's reputation, energy, resources, other relationships, and values. (It was pointed out that further research is necessary to ascertain, from Canada's point of view, the legality of some strategies.) These same policy options which are found attractive to Canadians need to be carefully reviewed with respect to the security and aspirations of the Burmese people. Action needs to address the interests of both Burmese and Canadians, according to Roundtable.

A Discussion About Economic Sanctions

Discussion turned to the question of economic sanctions and other measures to bring pressure on SLORC to change its policies and practices. NOTE: this discussion occurred just after US President Clinton announced [on 22 April] a new policy to prohibit further new US investment in Burma (while not interfering with existing contracts). This announcement was followed, in the days leading up to the Roundtable, by statements from Foreign Ministers of ASEAN member-countries that President Clinton's policy would not alter the timetable of accepting Burma as a member. However, it is reported that Burma will not achieve "dialogue partner" status for an indefinite period.