

standing item on the agenda of CSO meetings. This suggestion found favour.

### **The Economic Dimension**

Just as Canada believed that security in Europe could not be ensured without respect for human rights, it was equally of the view that human rights could not be secured in the absence of economic development. Canada wanted to maintain the integrity of the CSCE process itself, the principle of the interdependence of the three baskets and the ability of the CSCE to promote an interdisciplinary approach to security. The primary question was to see how Basket II would develop within the context of CSCE institutionalization.

The CSCE Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe, held in Bonn from March 19 to April 11, 1990, had achieved a substantial concluding document committing all participating states to principles of market economics, and linking economic development to fundamental Western values such as multi-party democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The document suggested that the possibility of CSCE meetings "aimed at periodic review of progress and providing new impulses for economic relations among participating States" should be examined at the Paris Summit or the Helsinki FUM.

Canada had proposed that the Paris Summit should decide to convene an economic meeting during 1991 to review progress and discuss future cooperation in all areas of Basket II. The Helsinki FUM could then consider establishing an annual Basket II conference, which would relate to, but not duplicate, the work of existing institutions. In the end, the Charter of Paris did not call for an economic meeting. Going into Helsinki, Canada continued to advocate follow-up to both the Bonn Conference and the Sofia Meeting on Environmental Protection (held in 1989), and to call for institutionalization of Basket II.

Basket II lent itself well to the work of existing economic institutions such as the OECD, ECE, EC and EBRD, and Canada welcomed the development of strong cooperative relationships between these organizations -- which aimed at developing solutions to specific problems -- and the CSCE, which aimed more at establishing a political framework for economic cooperation. However, Canada felt strongly that it should remain the task of the CSCE to follow up on decisions in the Basket II area. It wanted CSCE tasking of other organizations to be very precise and did not want to establish a *droit de regard* on CSCE economic activities by outside organizations.

### **Looking to Prague**

As seen by Canada, the CSCE's "conflict prevention mechanism," post-Berlin, consisted of a mixture of political commitments (e.g. to settle disputes by peaceful means) and institutional arrangements. The latter included:

- 1) a political-level "management structure," in the form of meetings of heads of government, foreign ministers and senior officials;
- 2) a direct management body, in the form of the CPC Consultative Committee; and
- 3) a support unit, in the form of the CPC which, in addition to supporting the implementation of CSBMs, could assume broader tasks related to dispute conciliation and settlement.

Other components of the conflict prevention mechanism included the provision for convening emergency CSO meetings, which enabled the CSCE to respond to problems in timely