

Chapter 5 - Apart from occasional glimmers, the UN human rights structures failed in the lead up to, and immediately after, April 6th. Subsequently their interventions have been unfocussed and largely ineffectual to date. Perhaps more unsettling is the feeling that some key UN human rights decision makers have not realised what they should have done, and thus are not actively looking for lessons to be learned. This has extremely negative implications for the next human rights 'Rwanda'.

Chapter 6 - Overarching coordination did not occur. This is not to deny a leap forward in coordination within the humanitarian community (Ch. 4) and to a lesser degree within the UN's peacekeeping and conflict resolution apparatus where DPKO, DHA, and DPA increased and are busy enhancing their consultative mechanisms (Ch. 3). Within other sectors such as human rights, there was little or no coordination either within the UN or with NGOs . With such uneven sectoral development, this time one could not reasonably anticipate any overarching coordination.

Conclusion - Both Rwandans and the international community abjectly failed to prevent widespread genocidal massacres and massive refugee flows. The international community partly mitigated its failure through rapid and effective humanitarian assistance. There are cautious grounds for optimism that some have learned from the Rwandan catastrophe, and will be more prepared to prevent similar cataclysms that threaten both Africa and the world.