

to begin one year after entry into force, if facilities are not planned soon enough this timeframe will be difficult to meet.

One can divide chemical weapons stockpiles into two groups; one at which destruction facilities will be built and another where the stocks will have to be moved for demilitarization. It would be logical to assume that the former will be where the larger stockpiles are located and, since the destruction facility should be under construction before entry into force if the State Party is to meet its goal of commencing destruction within 12 months, these sites should have inspectors permanently present. This would give a requirement for permanent inspection teams at the 8 United States sites and the 9 USSR sites to carry out initial verification, application of seals to weapons and/or silos, site closure and the review of the planning and construction of the destruction facilities for verification purposes.

Of course, if a destruction plant were already available, the task would become one of ensuring that destruction of weapons and agents could be verified. The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) developed by the United States for obsolete unitary weapons shows that three types of plants will be constructed there and that each will only be capable of dealing with one agent at a time. Therefore some reconfiguration of the plant and its protective system will be required to implement an agreed order of destruction of the various agents. It is