

Taken together these developments demonstrate that the principle of reasonable sufficiency (and its sub-principles) have been consistently applied, especially since the end of 1988. This trend, defined mainly by unilateral actions (internationally and domestically), but accomplished also within multilateral forums such as the CFE negotiations, involves a rejection of traditionally restrictive notions of quantitative parity. Overall this has resulted in the dramatically different approach to Soviet arms control which has been observed over the past while, for example in the acceptance of highly asymmetrical cuts in Soviet forces and armaments.

### 1. The December 1988 Announcement of Unilateral Reductions

On 7 December 1988, in an address to the United Nations, President Gorbachev made a dramatic announcement of substantial unilateral Soviet reductions in conventional offensive armaments and troops in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.<sup>65</sup> A total of 500,000 troops were to be disbanded (including 100,000 officers), and in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) region, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 pieces of artillery, 800 combat aircraft, bridging equipment, and assault landing (airborne) units were to be withdrawn.<sup>66</sup> Of the 500,000 troops, half were to come from the ATTU region. In addition, the announcement of Soviet reductions was followed by individual announcements of unilateral reductions by East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria, making the total reduction of even greater proportions.<sup>67</sup> To date, Soviet sources indicate

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<sup>65</sup> "Mikhail Gorbachev's Address To The United Nations", pp. 25-27.

<sup>66</sup> The breakdown of the intended Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) included: 50,000 troops, 5,000 tanks (6 divisions), 300 combat aircraft, and unknown amounts of artillery. See the analysis by Andrew Duncan in: "Conventional Arms Control", *Survival*, vol. XXXI, no. 3, May/June 1989, pp. 269-73. An announcement by Shevardnadze at the beginning of the CFE talks also offered to unilaterally reduce tactical nuclear weapons in East Germany by 500 warheads (24 launchers), although in Western Europe this was largely seen as a propaganda move intended to influence the NATO decision on the follow-on to Lance.

<sup>67</sup> Summaries of the East European figures can be found in: A. Duncan, "Conventional Arms Control", pp. 270-273.