

During the late sixties, Canada and the United Kingdom worked in concert with the United States in the international drafting of the NPT and in the safeguards system that the IAEA now uses to verify compliance with that treaty. This partnership gave Canada a strong voice in the negotiations that led to the final treaty.

Under the NPT, which came into force on March 5, 1970, member countries, including Canada, that did not possess nuclear weapons, were required to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities. These countries are commonly referred to as "non-nuclear weapons states." A model NPT safeguards agreement<sup>1</sup> was drawn up by the IAEA and approved by its Board of Governors before the end of 1970. Agreements based on this model are now applied in some 100 countries including most of those having significant nuclear activities. Canada and the IAEA concluded negotiations on a safeguards agreement in February 1972, at which time inspection of Canadian facilities commenced. The safeguards to be applied under these NPT agreements are for the exclusive purpose of verifying that all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear

activities within the territory of the signatory state "are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

Following the entry into force of the NPT, Canada continued to work with other nations to develop guidelines to be used by major nuclear suppliers when exporting nuclear material, equipment or technology to non-nuclear-weapons states. During 1971 and 1972, a group of states, including Canada, that were actual or potential suppliers of nuclear items, met to establish a consensus on items that would trigger safeguards under the terms of the NPT. This group was designated as the NPT Exporters' Committee but is commonly referred to as the Zangger Committee. A consensus, the so-called "Zangger List," was established with respect to material and equipment that would trigger NPT safeguards if exported to non-nuclear weapons states. In 1974, Canada indicated that it would act in accordance with that consensus.

Canada's non-proliferation policy was reviewed after India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in

1. "The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Document INFCIRC/153, June 1972.