

archetypical examples of Confidence-Building. Those Confidence-Building Measures –

Helsinki Final Act of 1975
(Ran from July 3, 1973 to August 1, 1975)

- (1) 21 days prior notification (if possible) of and basic information about major military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops;
- (2) Prior notification of other military manoeuvres (purely voluntary);
- (3) Exchange of observers for manoeuvres (very loosely worded);
- (4) Prior notification (again, purely voluntary) of military movements

however, seem to be far too narrow to be of any direct use in developing a reasonable understanding of Confidence-Building. Although we also looked at the CBMs contained within the Associated Measures of the MBFR negotiations and a host of definitions from the Confidence-Building literature, none seemed to capture the essence of Confidence-Building well. Various treatments were either too narrow and substantively specific or too vague and general. Therefore, we developed a composite definition of our own, one that seemed capable of accounting for a fairly wide variety of functional CBMs without becoming too general:

CBM Definition

- (1) CBMs are a variety of arms control measure entailing¹⁰⁸
- (2) state actions
- (3) that can be unilateral but which are more often either bilateral or multilateral

¹⁰⁸ Many analysts seem to think that this is not so. There are simply no compelling grounds, however, for saying that CBMs are not a type of arms control. A general and widely accepted definition of arms control counts those measures which reduce the chance of war occurring or the severity of war if it should occur. CBMs clearly qualify as measures designed to reduce the chance of war. That CBMs do not involve actual force reduction is not a sufficient reason for excluding them from the category of arms control measures. Indeed, there is also no obvious reason why measures involving force reductions should be excluded when measures sponsoring obvious equipment and manpower restrictions are counted as CBMs.

- (4) that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions about specific military threats or concerns (very often having to do with surprise attack)¹⁰⁹
- (5) by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless
- (6) often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive
- (7) and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be difficult to achieve
- (8) and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas.

In addition to this definition, we also developed an extensive set of categories in order to organize the wide range (over 100) of proposed Confidence-Building Measures.

CBM Categories and Proposals

A – Information and Communication CBMs

Information Measures

- publish technical information on force composition
- publish and discuss defence industry data
- publish regularized data on defence budgets
- publish arms control impact studies
- conduct “seminars on strategy”

¹⁰⁹ CBM deal with correcting misperception only in situations where no genuine, premeditated aggressive intent exists. It is the province of other types of arms control or unilateral action to address situations where intentions are genuinely aggressive. This distinction ignores temporarily the problem of deliberately using CBM for coercive purposes or to mask preparations for attack.

