tion of evidence, an injustice may result from the suppression of dissent. For example, he says, the decision of the majority may attach a serious imputation of fraud to an individual. But surely this is regarding the reports from a personal instead of a professional view-point --the fallacy which pervades the whole of the article in question. For the purpose of exculpating or mitigating the guilt of the individual, the dissent may be of consequence; but it is as mere surplusage when the question is what does such a case decide? The *Central Law Journal*, one of the best informed of our American legal exchanges, heartily endorses the views we have expressed on this subject.

The *Legal News* is vexed at our slighting allusion to the Lower Canadian decisions—their uncertainty and want of unanimity. But his own correspondent "S," points the contrast between the dignified self-repression of a Story and the effusiveness of those Courts where "each judge thinks his own opinion quite as good as that of any other judge, or bench of judges, or number of judges expressed at different times and rather better."

The writer of the letter in the *Legal News* continues in this strain:—"I have very little hesitation in saying that the decisions of our Courts have a larger degree of uncertainty about them than those of the Courts of any country with which we are at all familiar. And why? Because the judges in our Courts have not sufficient unanimity—or unity, perhaps, would express it better—in their bearing towards the jurisprudence of the Province as a whole; but treat each case separately and individually, and sometimes with very little regard for the opinions of each other."

We agree with our contemporary in one of his remarks, and that is that there should be no cast-iron rule, but that the matter should be left to the discretion and wisdom of the judges themselves, to decide when they should yield their individual opinion, and refrain from entering a dissent. As we know, some judges have no discretion, even when an Act of Parliament confers it upon them. The initial numbers of the Supreme Court Reports of the Dominion appear to us of evil omen from the length and repetition and conflict in the different judgments reported, and they suggested our protest against the manner of enunciating the conclusions of the Court. In such a Court, it would be well, in our view, to follow the English and United States precedents to which we have adverted, and, without making use of a "pious fraud" by concealing the dissent of any member of the court, yet not emphasizing that disagreement by reporting it at length, we would in every such case hope that the old distich might be verified:

"The judge dissents. Kind Lethe on its banks
Receives his honour's useful gift with thanks."

LAW SOCIETY.

Hilary Term, 1878.

The following is the resumé of the proceedings of the Benchers for this Term, published by authority:

The several gentlemen whose names are published in the usual lists were called to the Bar, and were admitted as Students of the Laws.

Tuesday, February 5.

In the absence of the Treasurer, Thomas Robertson, Esq., Q.C., was appointed Chairman.

Mr. Hodgins, from Legal Education Committee, presented the report on the