

### THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NEO-COMMUNISM (Continued from page 7)

tion in trade union activities and parliamentary action." (Theses and resolution, third congress of the Communist International, New York, 1921, pp. 52-55.) Every social democrat, of course, will agree with this paragraph; he will only claim that it was copied from the social democratic platforms and resolutions, and especially from their polemical literature against the communist romanticism. That the communists repudiated this view only one year before is plainly shown in Zinoviev's letter to the I. W. W., where he states that:

The question of whether or not Communists participate in elections is of secondary importance; some Communist organisations do, others do not, but those who do act on the political field do so only for propaganda. (Quoted by Postgate Bolshevik Theory, p. 234.)

And Bucharin plainly said at the Second Congress that:

The Antiparlamentarism of the I. W. W., which instinctively hates opportunistic parliamentarism and distrusts it, is more sympathetic.

The Comintern even declared officially that:

The Parliament can by no means be the arena for struggles for reforms for communists—for the amelioration of the conditions of the working class.

This is why the Comintern, while refusing to enroll such men as Kautsky, Bauer, Hillquit, MacDonald and others, made every effort to get within its ranks all the various anarchistic and anarcho-syndicalist elements. But the third congress, at last, repudiated its former tactics, expelled the anarchistic K. A. P. D. and rebuked its more ardent followers for their "Revolutionary Romanticism." Karl Radek interpreted the new tactics in the following words:

It is clear that in 1918-1919 we fought with other methods. Then we strove with all our means for splits, we placed the dictatorship of the proletariat in the foreground, while now, without changing our general demands, we place concrete transitory demands in the foreground. The communist parties have now the task of beginning the struggle for the conquest of the majority of the proletariat. This struggle can obviously not consist in repeating, parrot-like, the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Our duty is to take part in all struggles of the proletariat, to explain, step by step, the meaning of each struggle, according to the worker's own experience; to extend the battle front more and more; to increase speed toward the final goal.

That this is the correct standpoint of social democracy will be admitted by every one who is but superficially acquainted with the social democratic view on reforms and partial struggles. The third congress has really abandoned their neo-communism and returned to social democratic tactics—but they lack the courage to acknowledge it.

The new tactics were of too "sharp a turn" for the communist movement. Most of the national sections revolted; in some parties splits occurred. The Comintern, therefore, hastened to give a new definition of the new tactics. "We want a united front with all the other factions of the labor movement, so that we can break them up from within."

Evidently none of the non-communist parties could agree to such a united front. A united front is only conceivable when all the parties to it have good intentions, but it is absolutely impossible when the party that asks for a united front simultaneously declares that its aim is to unite in order to move quickly and destroy its partners. Thus the Comintern defeated its own aim. The new tactics of the united front have not only failed of their purpose, but they have also failed to strengthen the communist movement. From the reports of the fourth congress of the Communist International, we learn that every party in the Communist International is torn by internal strife, that the masses who followed the communists are drifting from their pivot. Moreover, the iron discipline of the Communist International did not succeed in holding the national sections within the bonds of "true revolutionary com-

munist." On the one hand there have developed left wings in all parties, who more and more tend to become anarchistic, and on the other hand, most of the communist parties are communist in name only, but reformists and opportunists in practice.

The situation in the International Communist movement from the third to the fourth congress is described by Zinoviev in the following manner:

It is comparatively easy to adopt a resolution; but it is a much harder task when it comes to practical work; even the attempt to carry out an international membership week failed because our parties are still heterogenous, because our parties are in many cases not yet communist. During the past year we have attempted several international campaigns. Among these the campaign for the united front was of special importance, and it must be frankly stated that this campaign did not proceed without much hindrance. (Fourth report of Congress of the Communist International, English Translation, pp. 15-16.)

The situations in different parties are not more cheerful. "The French party had failed to apply the tactics of the Communist International." "There are in France today 'three tendencies and two minor tendencies' that fight each other. The Italian communist party (that is, what is left of the Italian party) 'has often acted against the policy of the executive in the Italian question.' In Czecho-Slovakia the opportunist majority expelled the revolutionary minority. In Norway the communist party is only communist in name. (\*) It is high time," says Zinoviev, "to take action in Norway so that the demands of the Communist International may be complied with." The executive of the Communist International had also "certain differences of opinion with the Polish party" on the agrarian question and the question of nationalities. "The Balkan Federation is functioning poorly." "In England . . . we are growing very slowly; in no other country, perhaps, does the communist movement make such slow progress." "In America we have . . . a communist party with violent factional strife. Therefore, America is one of our most difficult problems." "In Hungary . . . the situation is pitiful." (See Zinoviev's Report to Fourth Congress. In Abridged Report (English) pp. 16-19-20, 22-23-25-26.) In general it can be said that the fourth congress showed that the "new tactic" was not effective in arresting the decline of the communist movement; on the contrary, it added theoretical confusion to the mood of despair that had set in on the movement. On account of its overvaluation in the revolutionary possibilities of the movement, the new tactic created instead of isolated revolutionary sects, isolated opportunist sects, trying desperately, but without success, to unite with the same "traitors and counter-revolutionists" whom they condemned only two years before.

\* The Norwegian party has been split since then.  
(The End.)

### TREATIES AND "BOES"

(Continued from page 2)  
reparations, in addition, total exports would have to be 16000 m. m. On the basis of 1913 exports, reckoning only a nominal half, Britain would take 2100 m.m. (in 1921 she took £20m.) France 1185 m. m., Russia 1320; Austria 1650 m. m., U. S. 1060 m. m. Most of these nations would "yiew with alarm" any such tendency even, toward such a capacity.

We can take the measure of the sagacity that claims, "Germany has the goods," "that she can pay if she likes," "that she is too lazy to work," etc. If Germany could work, the only visible movement in countries outside would be the transport of corpses—for German glue, maybe. Germany "won't work," for the same reason that the individual "won't work." Because the means of life in the hands and control of financial capital prevent the circulation of consumption until, and unless, they are first available for profit.

But, if "reparations" are so fanciful, why the loan? Where do the profits come in? If Germany is to deliver 2 m. t. reparation coal per month to France, that just equals 1913 exports (net). If Germany is to come to pre-war efficiency she must im-

port nearly 60 m. t. To do this, in addition to the loss of purchasing power, by reparation deliveries, involves exports far in excess of 1913 volume. Such a market would be good for business. Such a volume would raise the mass of profits enormously, but it would also depress the rate of profit to fractions, and the standard of life to meagrest need. In 1911 Carnegie reckoned an immigrant at \$2500, i.e., his labor produced values to that amount. Assuming \$8600 as an average wage, surplus production was four times the necessary. Technology must have maintained the rates at least. What the actual rate of exploitation may be, I know not. But that the ratio is high is undoubted. Percentages of 10, 20, 30 and over, are not uncommon. The 3 and 5 percentages shown are but flicker of the "dust" on the "water." The market price of shares at twice and three times par tell the same tale. The miner's election (1924) manifesto gives the capitalisation of the mines at £130 m. (approx.), and from 1914 to '23 inclusive profits and royalties of £259 m. Imperial tobacco, from '19 to '24 shows profits of £24 m. General and Keen, (coal and iron) '18 to '24 £4 m. Brunner, Mond, £6 m. (same time). Bleachess (textiles) £3½ m. J. P. Coats, £12¼ m. Courtald's (silk) £10 m. nearly. Lever (soap) £6¼ m. All '19 to '24. Showing that the organic composition of capital is high, and with it the rate of exploitation. Showing also that the very things that Germany is required to excel in, coal and iron, chemicals and (textiles probably), are also highly organic. Consequently, if the individual in the production of necessities produces magnitudes that make life a weary struggle with penury in like terms the production of interest on bonds demands a magnitude of commerce in the completion of international fixed capital, whose gathering will be frescoed with wool.

(To be continued)

### TABOOS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

(Continued from page 1)

devotees, but the lure of sex itself, masquerading as a scientific interest. This is as evident in the denunciation of what for convenience may be called Freudism as in its acceptance. Everywhere, up on both sides, the note of passion is discernible under the coolest parades of discussion. The assailants of the study exhibit (in trying to conceal it) the same sex-sensitiveness as the devotees themselves.

When, therefore, we reflect that none of these studies can exclude this inflammable material from its treatment, and that, for any comprehensive sociology, sex urges and activities and the institutions they help to mould and sustain, are of prime importance, we are driven to smile at the naivete of a social science boasting reason as its sole arbiter. It is not merely that instinctive emotions and valuations prevail in the social arts, but that they deflect the balance of reason in the social sciences.—(Socialist Review.)

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