

solved to her satisfaction; problems like the question of Outer Mongolia, Vladivostock, Port Arthur, and even the question of Siberia, all of which territories are considered by Asiatics to be integral parts of China and Asia.

The real motive would simply seem to be that Moscow knows that the more trouble she can make in the Middle East, the more awkward it will be for the West. Our views about Israel clash with our need to maintain friendly relations with the Arabs, who themselves have been divided by Moscow's intrigue into hostile sections, thus giving the communists the excuse they need for subversive interference to keep the peace. Meanwhile, Turkey, on the Soviet border, may be involved. And, to the West, Arab nationalism, encouraged by Moscow, can set North Africa ablaze the more easily in that the European attitude to countries like Algeria, created and civilized by Europe, clashes with American views which frown on all colonialism, however progressive.

In my statement I do not pretend to offer an expert survey on the factors involved in the Middle East today. The question I ask is, why is Russia, at this moment of decisive nuclear development, still going out of its way to make trouble in this area? Is Russia simply being awkward just to annoy, or has Russia chosen the Middle East as the place where, by standing firm and uncooperative at any cost, she can force the West to a humiliating and commercially disastrous surrender as the only alternative to risking the outbreak of the third world war?

To put it otherwise, is the Middle East, in regard to a third world war, what Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland were for Hitler in regard to the Second World War? For, at this moment, this is what it looks like. The Soviet made her eastern European conquests during the aftermath of war, knowing well that no one could or would stop her. The aggression, defeated by the Berlin airlift, and the Korean war, were calculated risks at a time when Russia was far behind the West in technical advances of every kind. Today, Russia feels herself the equal, or even the superior, of the West in armament and technique, and meanwhile she retains her immense advantage in military manpower as well as in submarines. These, apart from the use of H-bombs, would ensure immediate victory for the Soviet over Europe, Asia and Africa. And now she has played her cards so skilfully in the Middle East that she could any day take action which would give the West a simple choice between surrender or nuclear defence—in other words, the third world war.

However, in such a situation no doubt that there will be grave dangers for Russia,

and history may repeat itself. It must be remembered that during the last war, in the first three and a half months of Hitler's invasion of Russia he took as prisoners well over two million Russian soldiers fully equipped and with all their officers. Had Hitler not been such a tyrant and dictator himself, and had he not, by his terrible massacres of the civilian population of the Russian provinces which his armies had occupied, turned these people against him and swung their loyalty to Stalin, whom they deeply hated, Hitler could have defeated Stalin and communism with the Russian soldiers themselves, with very small losses to his own armies. It was unfortunate for the world that Hitler was a dictator. The presence of the British, Free French or Americans at the time would have changed world history.

At the end of the fighting in Korea almost half of 116,000 North Korean and Chinese military prisoners refused to return home. Among United Nations prisoners who preferred to live under communism the score was as follows: 325 South Koreans, 22 Americans, one Briton.

Blood will always be thicker than water. A German will always be a German, with the exception of a few renegades, and this applies to all the satellite countries at present under the Soviet yoke. Unless Russia can win a lightning war, her military situation will very quickly become exceedingly brittle and deteriorate rapidly, as none of those nations will have their heart in a fight to defend Soviet Russia. The political convulsions that have already happened in East Germany, Hungary and Yugoslavia will be terribly magnified under war conditions, with great defections among the armed forces even in Russia itself, as happened in World War II.

This does not mean that that situation should deter us from dealing from strength with Russia at all times, because this would be fatal to our cause, and there is no way for us of trying to read the minds of the dangerous men who govern Russia. Many people feel that the growing hatred of communism in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe must prevent Moscow from going too far; and, I mentioned a few moments ago, at the first sign of war millions would rise up in Eastern Europe, and perhaps within Russia itself, to revenge themselves on the oppressor. But unfortunately this view overlooks one important factor. The restiveness in Eastern Europe has been brought about by a feeling, right or wrong, that the ending of the Stalin era has made the Soviet less ruthless and more civilized. But if, in fact, the Soviet has not really changed at all or, if one prefers it, if the old communist aggression has simply changed to Russian