

representatives in New York. In my talks with Premier Zhao in January, I found that the Chinese had, since my visit to Peking, begun to express a readiness to consider such contacts in New York without the pre-conditions they had raised before.

The idea will take hold slowly, to be sure, as new ideas do. But I believe that it will take hold. For example: accidents, miscalculation, crisis, systems failure—these are nuclear perils which all of the five powers must cope with, and which they have the responsibility to manage co-operatively. I suggest, therefore, that an early focus of five-power consultations should be crisis management, particularly the handling of nuclear weapons incidents, and the improvements of crisis communications. Among the five nuclear weapons states, the two super-powers have by far the largest arsenals. They bear a corresponding responsibility to apply the same genius to reducing their arms as they did to developing them. They must not let their views of each other's morality and legitimacy prevent an early resumption of arms control talks. It is vital that they resume negotiations on limiting and reducing intermediate range and strategic nuclear weapons.

This past decade the superpowers have not ratified a single significant arms control agreement. In the preceding decade they had ratified a dozen. Gestures are needed to lift the clouds of suspicion. A useful step would be for both sides to ratify an agreement which they observe already: the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Mr. Speaker, I have been giving considerable attention so far to five-power relationships, to the bilateral environment of the super-powers, to multilateral talks and conferences.

Much of our own contribution to this work is enhanced by the consultative process open to us in NATO. NATO is a significant forum for Canada, whether in terms of national policy, of collective security, or of basic approaches to East-West relations. When NATO was formed in 1949, Canada insisted that it be a political alliance, as well as a military one, and Canada continues on that basis loyally to maintain our long-standing commitment to NATO and to its policies. But all institutions tend, by their very nature, towards inertia unless their members give them energy and a renewed sense of direction.

Thus I was gratified that NATO ministers decided at their December meeting to commission a full review of the steps NATO can take to improve East-West relations. Canada had been urging such an approach at successive NATO summits.

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The last such review, in 1967, took place at the initiative of Pierre Harmel, Foreign Minister of Belgium. Then, as now, there was a sense that things ought to change. There was a need for the Alliance to have a vision of the future, and a political strategy to achieve it. The document which resulted, known as "The Future Tasks of the Alliance", was a landmark

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in NATO thinking. It came to terms, as in this period we must come to terms, with the need for a broad policy which governs, and gives purpose to, our military security.

The Harmel Report's most profound conclusions were:

1. Military security and a policy of détente were not contradictory but complementary;
2. Work towards a balanced reduction of military forces should be intensified, as well as efforts to overcome instability and insecurity;
3. The world had changed since the formation of NATO in 1949, and that there was a need to look ahead—to gain sightlines on the future and to work along them; and
4. Each member of the Alliance had a contribution to make, not in subordination to, but in consultation with, the other members of the Alliance.

Mr. Speaker, despite frequent setbacks, the results of that policy are impressive, especially when viewed from today's perspective: the inter-German settlements of the late sixties; the bilateral promotion of ties with the USSR by many Western countries, including my own visit in 1971; elements of rapprochement in the superpower relationship—and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

We need to approach the coming period with the same spirit of enquiry, the same creative diplomacy, the same forward-looking vision.

The world has changed since 1967. We sense the shifts of power and psychology. East-West relations are far more complex than they were 17 years ago. There are competing trends of autarky, interaction, and interdependence, unforeseeable at that time.

It is essential that this new review chart a course for the Alliance to the end of this century. Canada will make its own contribution to the work, and abide by the results. I congratulate the current Belgian Foreign Minister, Leo Tindemans, for his part in launching the review. I welcome the incoming Secretary General, Lord Carrington—a man whose own ideas on East-West relations will inspire us with creativity and guide us with common-sense.

Mr. Speaker, NATO is an alliance of democracies. Open discussion and independent action are as important for us as they were for Harmel.

An alliance which fails to defend democracy in its councils will surely fail in its defence of democracy in the field. NATO summit meetings have a particular importance, and should be the senior level of responsible Alliance leadership and authentic debate. Prime Minister Thatcher and I discussed this point during her visit here last September. In my remarks after dinner in Toronto, I suggested that:

"—Canadians look upon NATO as the cornerstone of our defence policy. We do not wish to be silent partners, however. It is a political alliance, after all, and politicians like to discuss and even argue the issues. If we disagree from time to